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ABSTRACT
Secure routing Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) has emerged as an important
MANET research area. Initial work in MANET focused mainly on the problem of
providing efficient mechanisms for finding paths in very dynamic networks, without
considering the security of the routing process. Because of this, a number of attacks
exploit these routing vulnerabilities to manipulate MANETs. In this thesis, we performed
an in-depth evaluation and performance analysis of existing MANET Routing protocols,
identifying Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) as the most robust (based on throughput,
latency and routing overhead) which can be secured with negligible routing efficiency
trade-off. We describe security threats, specifically showing their effects on DSR. We
proposed a new routing protocol, named Authenticated Source Routing for Ad hoc
Networks (ASRAN) which is an out-of-band certification-based, authenticated source
routing protocol with modifications to the route acquisition process of DSR to defeat all
identified attacks. Simulation studies confirm that ASRAN has a good trade-off balance
in reference to the addition of security and routing efficiency.

iv

DEDICATION

To my beautiful and loving wife – Tochi; my brother – Fred; and my beloved family, for
their love and support.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to immensely thank my advisor, Dr. Shervin Erfani, for his guidance and
support for this research work. I also appreciate his care and imparting of knowledge in
other spheres of life.
I would also like to extend my gratitude and appreciation to Dr. A. Edrisy and Dr. H. Wu
for their support, flexibility and valuable feedback.
I am grateful to Ms. Andria Ballo for her support and direction which made my stay at the
Department awesome.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my brother – Fred Onuobia, all my
friends, my sisters and parents.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY .............................................................................. iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. xi
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER 1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS ………………………………………….2

1.1.1

Characteristics of Ad hoc Networks………………………………………3

1.1.2

Advantages of Mobile Ad hoc Networks…………………………………4

1.2

WIRE-LINE AND WIRELESS ROUTING PROTOCOLS...…………………4

1.3

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM…..…………………………………………….4

CHAPTER 2

ROUTING IN MANET

2.1

DESIRABLE QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES OF MANET ROUTING
PROTOCOLS…………………………………………………………………..8

2.2

MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS AND PROTOCOLS...……………………10

2.3

PROACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS……………………………………..14

2.3.1

Characteristics of Proactive Routing……………………………………..14

2.3.2

Advantages of Proactive Routing………………………………………...15

2.3.3

Disadvantages of Proactive Routing……………………………………..15
vii

2.4

REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS.……………………………………...16

2.4.2

Characteristics of Reactive Routing……………………………………...17

2.4.3

Advantages of Reactive Routing…………………………………………17

2.4.4

Disadvantages of Reactive Routing……………………………………...17

2.5

AODV – (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector)……………………………..18

2.5.1

Characteristics of AODV…………………………………………….......18

2.5.2

Route Discovery……………………………………………………….....20

2.5.3

Route Maintenance…………………………………………………….....23

2.5.4

Advantages of AODV……………………………………………………24

2.5.6

Disadvantages of AODV……………………………………………........24

2.6

DSR – (Dynamic Source Routing)……………………………………………25

2.6.1

Characteristics of DSR……………………………………………….......26

2.6.2

Route Discovery of DSR……………………………………………........27

2.6.3

Route Maintenance…………………………………………………........31

2.6.4

DSR Optimizations………………………………………………….........33

2.6.5

Advantages of DSR…………………………………………………........33

2.6.6

Disadvantages of DSR………………………………………………........35

2.7

COMPARISON BETWEEN AODV AND DSR.…………………………….35

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION OF MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND
REVIEW OF EXISTING WORK

3.1

EVALUATION OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS………………………………39

3.2

PERFORMANCE METRICS..………………………………………………..39

3.2.1

Throughput……………………………………………………………….39

3.2.2

Delay ...…………………………………………………………………..40

3.2.3

Routing Overhead ………………………………………………………..41

3.2.4

Energy Efficiency ………………………………………………………..41

3.3

REVIEW OF EXISTING MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS...…………….42

3.4

MODEL AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOL…………………………………45

viii

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY IN ROUTING

4.1

INTRODUCTION.……………………………………………………………44

4.2

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AD HOC NETWORKS..…………………..42

4.3

SECURITY MEASURES OR SERVICES REQUIRED IN MANET.……....49

4.4

ATTACKS IN MANETS……………………………………………………..52

4.4.1

Vulnerability of Existing Protocols………………………………………52

4.4.2

Active Attacks……………………………………………………………53

4.4.3

Passive Attacks…………………………………………………………...58

4.5

ATTACKS TARGETING DSR ROUTING PROTOCOL..…………………58

4.5.1

Attacks Using Modification……………………………………………...59

4.5.2

Attacks Using Impersonation or Spoofing……………………………….62

4.5.3

Attacks Using Fabrication………………………………………………..64

CHAPTER 5

5.1

ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY SOLUTIONS…………………………68

5.1.1
5.2

REVIEW OF EXISTING SECURE MOBILE AD HOC
NETWORK PROTOCOLS

Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN)…………………..68

SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS…………………………..69

5.2.1

Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)…………………………………………..70

5.2.2

Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector Routing (SEAD)……………...71

5.2.3

Ariadne…………………………………………………………………...72

5.3

HYBRID SOLUTIONS.………………………………………………………74

5.3.1
5.4

Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV)………..74

REPUTATION BASED SOLUTIONS..……………………………………...76

5.4.1

Watchdog and Path-rater………………………………………………....76

5.5

ADD-ON MECHANISMS TO EXISTING PROTOCOLS.………………….78

5.6

COMPARISONS OF THE EXISTING PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING
FOR MANETs………………………………………………………………...78

5.6.1

Requirements and Assumptions of Existing Secure Protocol…………...78
ix

CHAPTER 6

PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL

6.1

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF A SECURE AD HOC ROUTING
PROTOCOL…………………………………………………………………..82

6.2

PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL FOR MOBILE AD HOC
NETWORKS……………………………………………………………….…83

6.3

AUTHENTICATED SOURCE ROUTING FOR AD HOC NETWORKS
(ASRAN) …………………………………………………………………..…83

6.3.1

ASRAN Certification…………………………………………………….84

6.3.2

ASRAN Route Discovery…….………………………………………….86

6.3.3

ASRAN Route Setup…………………………………………………….88

6.3.4

ASRAN Route Maintenance……………………………………………..90

6.3.5

ASRAN Responses to Erratic Behavior………………………………….91

6.3.6

ASRAN Key Revocation………………………………………………...92

6.4

SECURITY ANALYSES AND APPRAISAL OF ASRAN …..……………..92

6.5

COMPARISON OF ASRAN TO EXISTING SECURE ROUTING
PROTOCOLS………………………………………………………………....95

CHAPTER 7
7.1

SIMULATION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

SIMULATION.……………………………………………………………….96

7.1.1

Performance Metrics…..…………………………………………………96

7.1.2

Simulation Parameters…………………………………………………...97

7.1.3

Methodology.…………………………………………………………….98

7.14

Discussion ……………………………………………………………….99

7.2

CONCLUSION..……………………………………………………………..100

7.3. FUTURE WORK.……………………………………………………………101
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 102
VITA AUCTORIS .......................................................................................................... 109

x

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1

Comparing Protocol Properties of AODV and DSR……………………..36

Table 2.2

Differences between AODV and DSR…………………………………...37

Table 4.1

Grouping Security Issues for MANETs into Layers of the OSI Model….48

Table 4.2

Threats to Availability……………………………………………………50

Table 4.3

Threats to Authentication………………………………………………...52

Table 4.4

Summary of Active and Passive Attacks on a MANET………………...57

Table 5.1

Operational Requirements for the existing Secure Ad hoc Protocols…...79

Table 5.2

Existing Secure MANET Routing Protocols Parameters………………..80

Table 5.3

Defense against Attacks………………………………………………...81

Table 6.1

Notations used for ASRAN……………………………………………..84

Table 6.2

Defense against attacks………………………………………………….95

Table 7.1

Simulation Test-bed……………………………………………………..97

Table 7.2

Simulation result values…………………………………………………99

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1

Broad Categories of Mobile Ad hoc Routing Protocols…………… 11

Figure 2.2

Classification of MANET Routing Protocol based on Network
Structure & Topology……………………………………………… 12

Figure 2.3

AODV Route Discovery and Maintenance…………………………21

Figure 2.4

AODV Route Discovery…………………………………………… 22

Figure 2.5

Creation of the route record in DSR……………………………… 29

Figure 2.6

DSR route discovery……………………………………………… 30

Figure 2.7

Breakdown Of DSR Route Discovery…………………………… 31

Figure 4.1

A Simple Ad hoc Network………………………………………… 59

Figure 4.2

Another Example of an Ad hoc Network………………………….. 60

Figure 4.3

Path Lengths Spoofed By Tunneling……………………………… 61

Figure 4.4

A sequence of events that form loops by spoofing of packets……...63

Figure 4.5

Ad hoc Network – Fabrication……………………………………. 65

Figure 5.1

SRP Packet Header………………………………………………… 70

Figure 5.2

SAODV Protocol Header………………………………………….. 75

Figure 6.1

Simple MANET Topology Employed to Explain ASRAN………. 84

Figure 6.2

ASRAN Certification……………………………………………… 85

Figure 6.3

Route Discovery Packet (DSR and ASRAN) ……………………... 86

Figure 6.4

Route Response Packet (DSR and ASRAN)……………………… 89

Figure 6.5

Route Error Packet (DSR and ASRAN)…………………………… 91

Figure 7.1

Simulation Block Diagram………………………………………... 97

Figure 7.2

Simulation Results………………………………………………… 98

xii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/SYMBOLS

MANET  Mobile Ad hoc Networks
AODV  Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
DSR  Dynamic Source Routing
ARAN  Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Network
ASRAN  Authenticated Source Routing for Ad hoc Networks
NS-2  Network Simulator 2

xiii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Networks are found almost everywhere and in most things in today’s world. Here we
define networks simply as a collection and interconnection of hardware components by
communication channels that allow sharing of resources and information. Networks can
be categorized based on a variety of characteristics such as the medium used to transport
the data, topology layout and organizational scope etc.
Based on medium used for communication and transportation of data, there are mainly
two types (I) Wire-line Networks (II) Wireless Networks
Wire-line Networks are networks of devices in which interconnection are achieved using
physical channels (i.e IEEE 802.3, CAT5 cables, optical fiber etc), while Wireless
Networks make use of radio waves and signals as the medium of propagation and
interconnection.
Wireless communication between mobile users is getting more popular and prevalent in
all areas of life. Recent technological advances in Very-Large Scale Integration (VLSI),
transmitters, mobile computers and communication devices such as wireless modems,
switches and routers has aided in the proliferation of wireless communication technology.
Two distinct approaches for enabling wireless communication between two hosts exist.
The first approach is the use of existing network infrastructure to carry data and possibly
voice as well. The major problems in this approach are that of handoff and fading. Also
these networks are limited to places with existing network infrastructure. The second
approach is networks that do not require a pre-existing infrastructure.
Hence wireless networks can be classified into two categories by architectures:
infrastructure based and infrastructure less Networks.
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1.1

WIRELESS AD-HOC NETWORKS

An Ad hoc network is a collection of mobile nodes which forms a temporary network
without the aid of centralized administration or standard support devices regularly
available in conventional networks [66]. Hence an Ad hoc network can be said to be a
collection of wireless mobile nodes forming a temporary network without the use of any
existing network infrastructure. This allows them to be deployed easily as scalable
topologies. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are self-configuring networks of mobile
nodes/routers connected by wireless links. A mobile node in a MANET has two
functions: 1) as a host and 2) a router. Each MANET node functions as its own router and
forwards packets to other peer nodes [53]. When a node wants to communicate with
another that is out of transmission range, intermediate nodes are used to relay messages.
This new type of self-deploying network may combine wireless communication with high
degree node mobility. Due to its self-configuration and self-maintenance capabilities,
MANETs have been receiving a lot of research attention lately. This flexibility makes
them attractive for many applications for a situation where either supporting structure is
unavailable or deployment is unfeasible [60]. The vision of mobile Ad hoc networking is
to support robust and efficient operation in mobile wireless networks by incorporating
routing functionality into mobile nodes.
Nodes should be able to enter or leave the network as they wish. With the network nodes
mobile, an Ad-hoc network will typically have a dynamic topology which will have
profound effects on network characteristics. Every node wishing to be a part and
participate in an ad-hoc network must be willing to forward packets for other nodes.
These nodes generally do have a limited transmission range, hence seeks the assistance of
its neighboring nodes in forwarding packets and therefore every node in an ad-hoc
network can act both as a host and as a router, forwarding packets between other nodes as
well as running user applications. A router is a device which routes and forwards packets
using a routing protocol. A mobile host is simply an IP-addressable entity or device
which might run user applications or offer some other services.
Ad-hoc networks have several advantages compared to traditional cellular systems. These
advantages include: (a) On Demand setup (b) Fault tolerance, and (c) Unconstrained
2

connectivity. Ad-hoc networks are also capable of handling topology changes and
malfunctions in nodes. It is fixed through network reconfiguration. This is for instance,
when a node exits the network and causes link breakages, affected nodes can easily
request new routes and use them to reach the destination. Mobile Ad-hoc networks often
have inadequate security mechanism in place within the network layer or MAC layer.

1.1.1

Characteristics of Ad Hoc Networks

A mobile Ad hoc network is an autonomous system of mobile nodes. The system may
operate in isolation, or may have gateways and an interface with a fixed network.
MANET nodes are equipped with wireless transmitters and receivers employing antennas
which may be omni-directional (broadcast), highly directional (point-to-point), or some
combination of both. MANETs are characterized by:
1) Dynamic Topologies: This is due to the fact that nodes are free to move
arbitrarily and change their physical location by moving around.
2) Limited Resources: Nodes in Ad hoc have the characteristics of limited CPU
capability, memory, and bandwidth hence often referred to as “thin client”.
Also an effect of the relatively low to moderate link capacities is that
congestion is typically the norm rather than the exception i.e. aggregate
application demand will likely approach or exceed network capacity
frequently.
3) Energy-constrained operation: Most or all of the nodes in a MANET may rely
on batteries or other exhaustible means for power hence system design
factoring optimization of energy conservation is highly important. Therefore
due to power usage has to be limited, thus leads to having a limited transmitter
range.
4) Limited Security: They are generally more prone to physical security threats.
This includes but is not limited to possibility of eavesdropping, spoofing, and
denial-of-service attacks. The decentralized nature of network control in
MANETs, provides additional robustness against the single points of failure of
more centralized approaches as well as throw up challenges as a result too.
3

1.1.2

Advantages of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The high interest in Mobile Ad hoc networks stems from its viability and benefits as
enumerated below:
(a) Low Cost of Deployment: Ad hoc networks do not require infrastructure
deployment as they are infrastructure-less. Hence it negates the cost and
administrative time required in the deployment and maintenance of wireless
infrastructure such as routers, switches, base transmitters etc.
(b) Fast deployment: Compared to other wireless networks such as WLAN, Ad
hoc networks are very convenient and easy to deploy requiring less manual
input and can be set up immediately on the fly when needed.
(c) Dynamic Configuration: Ad hoc network configuration and topology is very
flexible and can change dynamically with time. This is a useful feature for
easier administration.

1.2

WIRE-LINE AND WIRELESS ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Rules and conventions for communication between network devices or nodes are defined
by network protocol. Routing protocols are special purpose network algorithms designed
specifically for use by routers.
Both wireless and wire-line networks use the conventional layer three routing protocols
and algorithms.

1.3

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Network nodes will often be battery powered which limits the capacity of CPU, Memory
and bandwidth. Hence network functions have to be resource effective. Also Mobile Ad
hoc Networks comes with negligible or no security mechanisms built into its network and
4

routing functions. Hence, MANET Network functions such as routing, and security
services such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication and authorization has to be
incorporated and designed to cope with a dynamic and volatile network topology.
Securing MANET protocol is of the utmost importance and this thesis proposes solutions
to that effect.
In this work, we evaluated the existing routing protocols in MANET to obtain the best
performing. Among the metrics used, least routing overhead in a protocol was the most
desired. This is as a result of the additional load or bits of information needed to
incorporate our security improvements on the prototype protocol. We then proposed a
security enhancement (ASRAN), which is the addition of confidentiality, authentication,
and integrity security services and mechanisms.

5

CHAPTER TWO
ROUTING IN MANET

In a data communication network, if two or more nodes are not connected directly by a
communication link, for them to receive or send messages to each other, it needs to be
forwarded by intermediate nodes. Finding a path between two nodes on which to send
messages in data communication networks is called route acquisition process of routing.
Nodes dedicated to the routing task in a traditional network are called routers. Router
functions in a network include Packet switching; Packet filtering; Internetwork
communication; and Path selection. The routing protocol has two main functions,
selection of routes for various source-destination pairs and the delivery of messages to
their correct destination. There are three classes of routing protocols:
Link State: Link state protocols are based on Dijkstra Algorithm. It enables each node to
maintain a complete view or knowledge of the network topology having cost or metrics
for each link and route. This detailed overview of the entire routing domain enables each
node to calculate and make a decision on the best route from this first-hand information,
rather than listen to what its neighbor believes is the best route. Each node periodically
updates its view of the network topology by means of flooding of link costs by other
nodes. On initially discovering their neighbors, they synchronize their known topology
routes, after which they send only periodic hello messages to let their neighboring nodes
know they are still functioning and online. Link state routing protocols apply shortest path
algorithm in choosing the next-hop for each destination. It has fast convergence, uses less
bandwidth for updates and better scalability while conversely it takes up more CPU
power and requires more memory.
Distance Vector: Distance vector protocols are based on Bellman-Ford algorithm. They
concern themselves with the direction (vector) in which a destination lies and some
means of measurement (metric) it takes to reach that destination. Hence in distance
vector, each node only monitors the cost of its outgoing links and periodically informs its
directly connected nodes, an estimate of the shortest distance of all the connected and
6

learned network routes it knows. For this reason, they are referred to as “routing by
rumor”. It has the benefit of been more computation efficient, easier to implement and
requires less CPU resources and memory. However, it has the issues of slow convergence
as a result of the “counting-to-infinity” problem, not been bandwidth efficient and the
formation of both short-lived and long-lived routing loops to contend with.
Source Routing: This is a type of routing whereby a packet to be forwarded has to have
the complete path information to its intended destination. Hence the routing decision is
made at the source which is advantageous in avoiding routing loops. The key advantage
of a source routing design is that intermediate nodes do not need to maintain up-to-date
routing information in order to route the packets that they forward since the packets
themselves already contain all the routing decisions. It has a cost of requiring slightly
more overhead in acquiring and maintaining the path information used.
A number of ways exist to classify routing algorithms [39]. Routing protocols can be
classified into different categories depending on these properties





Centralized versus Distributed



Static versus Adaptive



Reactive versus Proactive

Centralized vs. Distributed: For centralized routing, all route choices are made at a
central node, which means the presence of dedicated infrastructure (i.e. a router) for
the computation of valid and best routes. In distributed protocols, the computation of
routes and decision making is shared among the network nodes with information
exchanged between them as necessary. The distributed protocol approach applies
aptly to Ad hoc networks where every node acts as both a host and router.



Static vs. Adaptive: This refers to route response to topology changes and traffic
input patterns. In static routing, the route path used by source-destination pairs is
fixed regardless of change in topology or traffic conditions. It is adversely affected
by link or node failure and is not flexible in response. High throughput is not
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guaranteed using static routing algorithm. It is recommended for either simple
network or networks where efficiency is not essential.
Adaptive routing is more of an interactive type where a change in traffic input
patterns and or network topology elicits a response in route computation to offset or
match the change. It is also referred to as Dynamic Routing. The routing protocol in
this case tries to change its routes and guide traffic using other route paths to mitigate
congestion and ensure high throughput. This applies to mobile Ad hoc networks
because it is adapted and suited for high mobility nodes and changing network
topology.


Reactive vs. Proactive: This classification highly relates to ad-hoc networks.
Proactive routing protocols maintain routing information that is immediately
available by continuously evaluating the routes within the networks. This is so that
when a packet needs to be forwarded, the route is already known and can be
immediately used. On the contrary, reactive protocols must first determine the route
hence can be said to invoke a route determination procedure on demand basis only.

2.1

DESIRABLE QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES OF MANET ROUTING
PROTOCOLS

These are properties desirable in Ad hoc routing protocols [8]:


Distributed Operation: As Ad hoc network is basically a distributed collection of
nodes, its routing protocol is also expected to be distributed. Therefore, MANET
routing protocols should be distributed, independent without relying on a central
controlling node. This applies even in the case of a stationary network as in an Ad
hoc network, mobility should always be factored in, as nodes can enter or leave
the network easily.



Unidirectional Link Support: In conventional design of routing algorithms,
bidirectional links are typically assumed as many protocols are incapable of
functioning properly over unidirectional links. However, unidirectional links can
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and do often occur in Ad hoc wireless networks hence is a property expected of
MANET routing protocols.


Loop-freedom: It is generally desirable to avoid route loops in any network
protocol. This guarantees improved overall performance by avoiding wastage of
bandwidth and CPU consumption.



Demand-based operation: It is more efficient if the routing protocol adapts to
traffic patterns on a demand or need basis instead of assuming uniform traffic
distribution within the network hence maintaining routing between all nodes at all
times. The protocol should be reactive and if designed intelligently, can utilize
node’s power and network bandwidth resources more efficiently at the cost of
increased route discovery delay.



Energy conservation: As the nodes in Ad hoc networks are usually devices or thin
clients which are mainly battery powered and therefore needs to conserve power
when inactive using standby modes. It is therefore important, a routing protocol
should be able to accommodate and support such sleep modes without overly
adverse consequence. This property may require link layer protocol support
through a standardized interface.



Multiple routes: Multipath routing should be supported. In the case of topological
changes and or congestion, the reaction or response will be more efficient if
multiple routes are used. This saves the routing protocol from initiating another
route discovery procedure and reduces latency and network resources usage [59].



Quality of Service Support (QoS): This is a set of service requirements that needs
to be met by the network while transporting a packet stream from a source to its
destination. Its needs are normally set according to the service requirements of
end user or host applications, of which it is expected to guarantee a set of
measurable pre-specified service attributes to the users in terms of end-to-end
performance, such as delay, bandwidth, packet loss probability, delay variance
(jitter) etc. Power consumption is a QoS attribute also more specific to MANETs.



Security: MANET routing protocol is vulnerable to many forms of attack without
some form of network level or link-layer security. As it is harder to maintain
“physical” security of the radio transmission media which make MANETs open to
9

all forms of security threats and attacks, preventive security measures are highly
needed. Authentication and encryption will aid the mitigation most threats but the
problem here lies in the distributed nature of the Ad hoc network. Securing
MANET protocol is of the utmost importance and this thesis proposes solutions to
that effect.
2.2

MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS AND PROTOCOLS

There are different criteria for designing and classifying routing protocols for wireless Ad
hoc networks. MANET routing protocols can be divided into the following categories:


Flat Routing Protocols


Proactive Routing (Table-Driven)



Reactive Routing (On-Demand)



Hybrid Routing (blend of reactive and proactive)



Hierarchical (Zone/Cluster-Based) Routing Protocols



Geographic Position Assisted Routing Protocols



Power-Aware Routing Protocols



Security-Aware Routing Protocols



Routing Protocols with efficient flooding mechanisms



Multicasting Routing Protocols


Geographical Multicast (Geocasting)



Tree-Based



Mesh-Based



Zone Routing



Associativity-Based



Differential-Destination



Weight-Based



Preferred Link-based
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All these categories of routing protocols are primarily based on flavors of distance-vector
or link-state routing or a combination of both in addition to extra functionalities to aid and
adapt the routing operations in particular ways.

Figure 2.1

Broad Categories of Mobile Ad hoc Routing Protocols

The goals of these protocols could be summarized as [41]:


Minimal Control Overhead



Minimal Processing Overhead



Multi-hop Routing Capability



Dynamic Topology Maintenance



Loop Prevention

Though Ad hoc routing protocols can be loosely classified using various criteria’s as
enumerated above but we will be using a broad classification based on network structure
and topology as shown in figure 2.2 below.
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Ad-hoc Routing Protocols
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Figure 2.2

Geographic position assisted
routing

Hierarchical Routing

DSDV BRP

AODV

OGSR

ZAP LAN

DSR
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Geocast

LAR

DREAM

GPSR

Classification of MANET Routing Protocol based on Network
Structure & Topology

As shown in Figure 2.2, Ad hoc routing protocols can be grouped and fall into three
major vertical and two horizontal categories. The vertical categories are: Flat,
Hierarchical, and Geographic Position Assisted Routing. Horizontal categories are:
Reactive (On-Demand) and Proactive (Table-Driven).


Geographic Position Assisted Routing: This category uses geographical location as a
basis. The main purpose is to integrate concept of physical location into the current
design which relies on logical addressing. In Geographic Position Assisted Routing, a
message is sent to a group of mobile nodes within a particular geographical region
i.e. the geocast region. Hence this category uses the position of nodes i.e. Global
Positioning System (GPS) for an efficient routing. Examples of related routing
protocols are:
 Location Aided Routing (LAR)
 Geocast
 DREAM
 GPSR
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Hierarchical Routing: Here there is a grouping of individual nodes into clusters or
grouping of clusters into bigger ones with a delegation of tasks or functions. This
entails some nodes performing tasks while others wait until the task is handed over to
the next level. The network is split logically into tiers, with probably a tier one node
as the controlling node for a cluster. They are also referred to as cluster heads of
which a cluster head is just a node in a cluster but also shares a boundary with
another cluster and is assigned some control functions or tasks to be performed on
behalf of its cluster.
In hierarchical routing, the Ad hoc network is logically separated into subnets. A
hierarchical addressing structure is needed for routing in the network [46]. Examples
of protocols in this category are:
 Host Specific Routing (HSR)
 Cluster-head Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR)
 Zone Routing Protocols (ZRP)
 LANMAR



Flat Routing: As the name infers, all Ad hoc elements and routing are of the same
level. This means all nodes are on the same tier. Therefore there is no splitting or
segregation of the network into tiers or levels. Neither is there typically a grouping of
nodes into clusters. Flat routing protocols regard the Ad hoc network as a number of
nodes without subnet partitioning, thus does not require a hierarchical addressing
structure [46]. Flat routing protocols can be grouped further more into horizontal
categories of:


Proactive (Table Driven) and



Reactive (On-Demand) routing protocols.

This category of routing will be discussed in detail in this thesis. Also this is where
the optimal routing protocol employed in the security solution and enhancement
proposed in this work is chosen from.
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2.3

PROACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS

This kind of routing protocols record routes for all destinations in the network, which is
based on traditional wire-line routing protocols. In proactive routing, routes to all
destinations are computed prior with the protocol having a complete knowledge of the
topology and link states are maintained in the nodes’ routing tables in order to compute
routes in advance. The routing information is disseminated among all nodes in the
network throughout the operating time irrespective of the need for such a route [55].
Therefore, proactive routing is has most basic characteristics of “link state” routing
protocol as each node maintains a view of the entire network topology with a cost for
each link.
Proactive is also regarded as table-driven routing protocols. It can be subdivided
depending on how the routing tables are constructed, maintained and updated [4]. Some
of the existing proactive routing protocols are:
Fisheye State Routing (FSR); FSLS; Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP); Optimized LinkState Protocol (OLSR); Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV); Global State
Routing (GSR); Source Tree Adaptive Routing (STAR); BRF.
2.3.1

Characteristics of Proactive Routing

 To keep up information up to date, routing tables or new routes are periodically
broadcasted in the network between nodes.
 The updates are grouped into two according to the overhead packets generated.
There are two types of packets called ‘full dump’ packets and ‘incremental’
packets.
 Initial convergence occurs by the exchange of the full routing table and routes
(full dump packets) when establishing or during initial network setup. Subsequent
network topology changes or mobility are periodically communicated by the use
of incremental packets of the specific network changes.
 Each node periodically broadcasts the link costs of its outgoing links to all other
nodes using flooding.
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 The keep record in one or more routing tables and information of the routes in the
topology is stored there.
 Each mobile node maintains a routing table that contains information about a
route to every possible destination in the network and the number of hops of each
route.
 Each route contains a sequence number assigned by the destination node. The
sequence number allows a mobile node to distinguish between stale routes and
new routes.
Route creation and maintenance are accomplished through some combination of periodic
and event-triggered routing updates. Periodic updates consist of routing information
exchanges between nodes at particular time intervals. This occurs regardless of the
mobility and traffic characteristics of the network. However, event-triggered updates are
transmitted whenever some event, such as a link addition or removal occurs.
2.3.2

Advantages of Proactive Routing

 There is reduced latency in proactive routing as the route is already available and
can be immediately selected from the routing table when a source needs to send
packets [66].
 Efficient forwarding of packets as the route is known at the time when the packet
arrives at the node.
 Proactive protocols tend to perform well in networks where there are significant
numbers of data sessions within the network as the overhead of maintaining each
of the paths is justified as many of the paths are utilized.
2.3.3

Disadvantages of Proactive Routing

 It has the disadvantage in that some routes may never be used and dissemination
of routing information takes up a lot of the scarce network bandwidth as the states
of the links and network topology change rapidly in large networks or high
mobility ones.
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 Also, proactive routing performs full lookup of the routing table for every packet,
hence consumes more power as a result of higher CPU cycles needed for the task
[47].
 Additional control traffic is needed to regularly update stale route entries of
broken and re-established links as in Ad hoc mobile networks, there is bound to be
a mobility of nodes [55].
 Also, purely proactive routing schemes use a large portion of bandwidth to keep
routing information up-to-date and because of fast node mobility, route updates
may be more frequent than the route requests.

2.4

REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS

These protocols are called reactive protocols as they initiate routing activities on an “ondemand” basis. This reactive nature of these protocols is a significant departure from
more traditional proactive protocols that find routes between all source-destination pairs,
regardless of the use or need of such routes. Reactive protocols do not maintain routing
information or routing activity at the network nodes if there is no communication. A
source node obtains a path to a specific destination only when it needs to send some data
to it. In an Ad hoc network, link connectivity can change frequently and control overhead
is costly hence reactive routing approaches take a departure from traditional internet
routing approaches by not continuously maintaining a route between all pairs of network
nodes. Instead, routes are only discovered when they are actually needed.
Reactive routing protocols are also called source initiated on-demand routing protocol.
When a source wants to send a packet to another node, it checks to determine whether it
has a route, if not, then this protocol searches for the route in an on-demand manner by it
initiating a route discovery process in the network and establishes the connection in order
to transmit and receive the packet. The route discovery process usually occurs by flooding
route request packets throughout the network [49]. The discovered routes are maintained
by a route maintenance procedure.
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2.4.2

Characteristics of Reactive Routing

 Reactive routing does not have a complete knowledge of the network topology.
That is, it does not maintain routes for all destination nodes in the network
topology.
 Routes to active destinations already traversed and maintained at a node, will
expire after some time of inactivity, during which the network is not being used.
 It can maintain traditional routing tables specifying the next hop to reach a
destination or a route cache of routes already traversed.
 Routes are maintained only between nodes which need to communicate [10].
2.4.3

Advantages of Reactive Routing

 Control signaling overhead is likely to be reduced compared to proactive
approaches, particularly in networks with low to moderate traffic loads.
 Uses far less bandwidth in maintaining routes at each node hence aids in
conserving precious bandwidth of Ad hoc network.
 Key motivation behind the design of on-demand protocols is the reduction of the
routing load. High routing load usually have a significant performance impact on
low bandwidth wireless links [16].
2.4.4

Disadvantages of Reactive Routing

 A drawback to reactive approaches is the introduction of latency due to its route
acquisition processes. That is, when a route is needed by a source node, there is
some finite latency while the route is discovered.
 If the topology of networks changes rapidly, a lot of update packets will be
generated and disseminated over the network consuming a lot of precious
bandwidth.
 Also, mobility when using reactive routing protocols may cause too much
fluctuation of routes.
 Pure reactive routing is less suitable for real-time traffic as a result of its increased
latency or long setup delay.
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Examples of the protocols in the Reactive routing protocol class are: Dynamic Source
Routing Protocol (DSR), Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol
(AODV), and Temporally Ordered Routing Protocol (TORA). We are going to use Ad
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) and Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) as our reference reactive protocols, discussing and comparing them to
greater detail.

2.5

AODV – (Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector)

The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing Protocol enables multi-hop
routing between participating mobile nodes in an Ad hoc network. As a reactive routing
protocol, it minimizes the number of broadcasts by providing route discovery on-demand
in mobile Ad hoc networks. That is, AODV only requests a route when needed and does
not require nodes to maintain routes to destinations that are not recently or actively used
in communication. It is based upon the distance vector algorithm. As with most reactive
routing protocols, route finding is achieved by a route discovery cycle involving a
broadcast network search and a uni-cast reply containing discovered paths. Similar to
DSDV, AODV relies on sequence numbers for routing loop prevention and to identify
most recent route path. For a network using AODV routing, nodes stores next-hop routing
information for destination nodes, in a route table. Each routing table entry has an
associated lifetime value. If a route is not utilized within the lifetime period, the route
expires, becoming invalid with the entry then deleted from the routing table. However,
each time the route entry is used, the lifetime period is updated so that route is not
prematurely deleted.
2.5.1

Characteristics of AODV

 It enables multi-hop routing between mobile nodes in a MANET.
 AODV only request a route when needed or demanded.
 It retains only routes recently used and does not maintain routes to destinations
that are not actively used in communications. Also, as long as there is no request
18

or the on-going communication has valid routes to each other, it does not play any
role.
 It supports multicast routing and mitigates the Bellman Ford “counting to infinity”
problem utilizing destination sequence numbers.
 A node in AODV routing, updates its path information only if the destination
sequence number of the current packet received is greater than the last destination
sequence number stored in the route entry at the node [55].
 The AODV algorithm uses different messages to discover and maintain route
links. They are:
o It broadcasts a Route Request (RREQ) to all its neighbors when a node
wants to find a route to another node.
o It uses hello messages broadcasted periodically in the form of special
Route Reply (RREP) to immediate neighbors. These hello messages serve
as advertisements to indicate the continued presence of the node.
o In the event of a link failure or topology change, a Route Error
Packet(RERR) is used for link failure notification and sent to the affected
set of nodes.
 Each node maintains in the routing table, one entry per destination hence no
multiple paths are stored or available.
 A set of predecessor nodes is maintained for each routing table entry, indicating
the set of neighboring nodes which use or have used that entry to route data
packets.
 AODV keeps track of recently traversed routes by entering them in the routing
table. The route entries has the following information:[67]
o Destination IP Address – The IP address for the destination node
o Destination Sequence Number
o Hop Count – Number of hops to the destination
o Next Hop – The designated neighbor to forward packets to the destination
for the route entry
o Lifetime – The time period which the route entry is considered valid
(renewed if route is used)
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o Active Neighbor List – Neighbor nodes which actively use this route entry
o Request Buffer – Used to ensure that a request is only processed once
 It has a characteristic of minimal space complexity whereby the algorithm makes
sure that the nodes that are not in the active path do not maintain information
about a requested route. When a node receives the Route Request Packet (RREQ),
sets a reverse path in its routing table and propagates the RREQ to its neighbors, if
it does not receive any Route Reply Packet (RREP) from its neighbors for that
request, it deletes the routing information that it recorded.
2.5.2

Route Discovery

When a source node needs or has data packets to send to some destination, it first checks
whether it already has a route entry to the destination in its route table. If a route entry
exists, it will then use the route for the data packet transmissions. However, if it does not
find a route in its routing table, it must initiate a route discovery procedure to find a route.
To start route discovery, the source node will create a Route Request Packet (RREQ). In
the packet, it enters the destination node’s IP address, the last known sequence number
for that destination, and the source IP address and current sequence number. The RREQ
will also contain a hop count, initialized to zero, and a Route Request ID (RREQ ID) also
known as broadcast ID.
The RREQ ID or broadcast ID is a per-node identity number with an increasing counter
that is incremented each time the node initiates a new RREQ. Therefore, the source IP
address together with the RREQ ID, uniquely identifies a RREQ and can be used to detect
duplicates and identify the most recent. After the creation of the Route Request Packet,
the source node broadcasts the RREQ to its neighbors.
After forwarding the RREQ, a neighboring or intermediate node, on receipt of the RREQ,
first creates a Reverse Route to the source node. It records the reverse route as an entry in
its route table of the source node from which the first copy of the request came. Also the
node from which it received the RREQ is then designated as the next hop to the source
node and the hop count in the RREQ is incremented by one to get the hop distance from
the source. If additional copies of the same RREQ are later received, these packets are
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discarded. The node then checks its own routing table to determine if it has an unexpired
route to the destination. If it does not have a valid route to the destination, it simply
rebroadcasts the RREQ, with an incremented hop count value to its neighbors. Hence, in
this manner, the RREQ floods the network in search of a route to the destination. Figure
2.3(a) below illustrates this procedure [34].

Figure 2.3

AODV Route Discovery and Maintenance

However, when a node receives a RREQ and after checking whether it has an unexpired
or valid route to the destination, if it does have such a route, a condition has to be fulfilled
for the node to generate a reply message containing the route to the destination. The
condition is that this node’s route table entry for the intended destination must have a
corresponding sequence number that is at least equal or greater than the one contained in
the route request RREQ.
Condition --->
When this condition holds, it means that the node’s route table entry for the destination is
at least as recent as the source node’s last known route to the destination. This condition
ensures that the most recent route is selected and also guarantees loop freedom. Once this
condition is met, the current node can then create a Route Reply Packet (RREP) message.
The RREP contains the source node IP address, the destination node IP address, and the
destination sequence number as given by the node’s route table entry for the destination.
In addition, the hop count field in the RREP is set to correspond to the node’s distance
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from the destination. If the destination itself is creating the RREP, the hop count is set
equal to zero. After creating the reply – RREP, the node uni-casts the message to its next
hop towards the source node. The node utilizes the reverse route it created and recorded
in its routing table in forwarding the RREP back to the source node [10].

Figure 2.4

AODV Route Discovery

As the RREP is routed back along the reverse path, nodes along this path on receipt of the
RREP, first creates a forward route entry for the destination node in their route tables
which point to the node from which the RREP came. That is, it uses the node from which
it received the RREP as the next hop towards the destination node. These forward route
entries indicate the active forward route. The hop count for that route is the hop count in
the RREP, incremented by one. Associated with each route entry is a route timer which
will cause the deletion of the entry if it is not used within a specified lifetime. This
forward route entry for the destination is for utilization if and when the source selects this
path for data packet transmissions to the destination. On creating the forward route entry,
it forwards the RREP to the destination node. Because the RREP is forwarded along the
path established by the RREQ, AODV only supports the use of Symmetric links as the
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route reply packet follows the reverse path of the route request packet. The RREP is then
forwarded hop by hop to the source node as indicated in the figure 2.4(b) above [34].
On receipt of the RREP by the source node, it then utilizes the path for the transmission
of data packets. If more than one RREP is received, the source node selects the route with
the greatest sequence number and smallest hop count. It is then established and entered
into the routing table, maintaining it as long as it is needed and recently used. A route that
has been recently utilized for transmission of data packets is called an active route. Hence
a route is considered active as long as there are data packets periodically travelling from
the source to the destination along that path. Each node maintains in the routing table one
entry per destination. Therefore, multiple paths are not stored or available in AODV.
2.5.3

Route Maintenance

Routes are maintained as follows. If a source node moves, it is able to reinitiate the route
discovery protocol to find a new route to the destination. If a node along the route moves,
its upstream neighbors will notice the move or link failure and propagate a link failure
notification message (which is an RREP with infinite metric) to each of its active
upstream neighbors to inform them of the erasure of that part of the route. These nodes in
turn, propagate the link failure notification to their upstream neighbors, and so on until
the source node is reached. The source node can then choose to reinitiate route discovery
for that destination if needed.
AODV specifies two different ways in which a link break can be detected. An aspect of
the protocol route maintenance is through all nodes regularly broadcasting a “hello”
message to its one-hop neighbors. Periodic local broadcasts (‘hello’ messages) by a node,
is used to inform each of the mobile nodes in its neighborhood, of its presence and
continued operation. Hello messages can be used to maintain the local connectivity of a
node. This makes it possible for them to verify link operation, immediately identifying
link breakage or node dissociation. Also, hello messages may list the other nodes from
which a mobile node has heard from, thereby yielding greater knowledge of network
connectivity. The second way is detection through a link signaling mechanism when the
link is used.
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2.5.4

Advantages of AODV

 It optimizes available bandwidth as it does not require periodic global
advertisements.
 It is a simple protocol to implement in the network and makes the network selfstarting. This is with each node behaving as a router, maintaining a simple routing
table, and the source node initiating path discovery request.
 AODV has the advantage of selecting the best routes to a destination node as a
result of its usage of both the lowest hop-count and the latest valid path (made
possible by its use of the higher destination sequence number).
 The algorithm is highly scalable because of the minimum space complexity and
the broadcasts avoided.
 Because of its reactive nature, and its efficient route maintenance mechanisms
which enables it to respond quickly to broken links, AODV can handle highly
dynamic behavior.
2.5.5

Disadvantages of AODV

 It has a disadvantage of overdependence on broadcast medium. That is, the
algorithm expects or requires the nodes in the broadcast medium can detect each
other’s broadcasts.
 When compared to other reactive protocols, AODV incurs a higher overhead
bandwidth. This comes about from an RREQ when travelling from node to node
in the process of route discovery on-demand, it sets up the reverse path with the
addresses of all the nodes through which it is passing and then carries all this
information all the way.
 AODV lacks an efficient route maintenance technique as there is limited reuse of
routing information and routes are always obtained on demand including for
common cases traffic [65].
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 It is highly vulnerable to misuse – its messages can be misused and replayed for
insider attacks including route disruption, route invasion, node isolation, and
resource consumption.
 As it is designed solely to use hop count as metric, it favors long, low-bandwidth
links over short, high bandwidth links. Therefore AODV lacks support for high
throughput routing metrics.
 As characteristic of reactive routing protocols, AODV does not discover a route
until a flow is initiated. This route discovery adds latency and can be quite high in
large-scale full mesh networks.

2.6

DSR – (Dynamic Source Routing)

The Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) is simple and efficiently designed
specifically for routing purposes in multi-hop wireless Ad hoc networks of mobile nodes.
DSR allows the network to be completely self-organizing and self-configuring, without
the need for any existing network infrastructure, pre-administration or administration. The
DSR protocol provides highly reactive service in order to help ensure successful delivery
of data packets in spite of node movement or other changes in network conditions. The
key distinguishing feature of DSR is the use of source routing, where the sender knows
the complete hop-by-hop route to the destination. These routes are stored in a route cache.
The data packets carry the source route in the packet header. It comprises of two major
mechanisms that work together to allow the discovery and maintenance of source routes
in the Ad hoc network: “Route Discovery” and “Route Maintenance”. Route Discovery is
the mechanism by which a node originating a packet to some destination discovers a
source route to that destination if it does not currently have a route to that destination
cached. Route Maintenance is the mechanism by which a node sending a packet to some
destination learns if the route it used for that packet has broken (i.e. because some node in
the route has moved out of wireless transmission range of the previous node in the prior
existing route).
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The protocol allows multiple routes to any destination (multipath routing) and allows
each sender to select and control the routes used in routing its packets which is handy for
use in load balancing or for increased robustness. In the IETF rfc 4728, the design
specification and provision is for Ad hoc networks up to a couple hundreds of nodes.
DSR is an on-demand protocol designed to restrict the bandwidth consumed by control
packets in Ad hoc wireless networks by eliminating the periodic table update messages
which in contrast is required in the table driven approach and even as found in AODV.
2.6.1

Characteristics of DSR

 DSR makes use of source routing, where the sender knows the complete hop-byhop route to the destination. Instead of being forwarded hop by hop, data packets
contain strict source routes that specify each node along the path to the
destination. The data packets carry the source route (total hop-by-hop route
information to a destination) in the packet header.
 It utilizes a route cache for maintaining and tracking routing information instead
of a route table. In the route cache, it stores all possible information extracted
from the source route contained in a data packet. Entries in the route cache are
continually updated as new routes are learned.
 The route entries in the DSR route cache need not have lifetimes. That is, once a
route is placed in the route cache, it can remain there until it breaks.
 There is no special mechanism needed to detect routing loops as DSR makes very
aggressive use of source routing and route caching.
 It makes use of a mechanism called route salvaging to repair a link break in the
event that its node upstream has a different valid route to the destination in their
route cache.
 In DSR, nodes can receive and process data and control packets that were not
addressed to them at the MAC layer, using it to gratuitously learn routing
information for other network destinations. This option is a characteristic of DSR
known as promiscuous listening.
 DSR requires no periodic packets of any kind at any layer within the network.
Hence it does not use any periodic routing advertisement, link status sensing, or
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neighbor detection packets. It also does not rely on these functions from any
underlying protocols in the network.
 It is beacon-less and does not require hello packet transmissions which are used
by a node to inform its neighbors of its presence [55].
 It utilizes only event-triggered updates.
 A node sending a packet using DSR, can select and control the route used for its
own packets as a result of multiple route information and its multipath support.
 It makes use of a “soft state” approach in routing. Soft state in that the loss of any
state will not interfere with the correct operation of the protocol. That is also, that
routing information can be discarded without any warning or collaboration with
other nodes (as a local decision) and the network could continue to operate. All
state is discovered as needed and can easily and quickly be rediscovered if needed
after a failure without significant impact on the protocol.
 DSR is capable of routing correctly over networks using unidirectional links,
since the path over which the Route Reply (RREP) is sent need not be the same as
the reverse of the path over which the Route Request (RREQ) was forwarded.
 Host may use its route cache to avoid propagating a RREQ received from another
host. This is because, on receipt of a RREQ, the node checks its route cache first
to check if it has a route to the requested destination and only if it does not, will it
forward the RREQ onwards.
 The initiator of a RREQ can specify the maximum number of hops or maximum
hop limit for the RREQ to travel.
2.6.2

Route Discovery of DSR

When a mobile node has a packet to send to some destination, it first consults its route
cache to determine whether it already has a route to the destination/target node. If it has
an unexpired route to the destination, it will use that route to send the packet. On the other
hand if the nodes not have such a route, it initiates a route discovery process to
dynamically determine such a route.
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In a route discovery, a node A wanting to send a packet to some node D of which it does
not have a route entry to in its route cache, will broadcast a Route Request Packet
(RREQ), which is received by nodes within wireless transmission range of D. This Route
Request (RREQ) contains the IP address of the destination, along with the source node’s
address and a unique identification number for this route discovery chosen by the source
node A. The source node A is referred to as the originator/source of the Route Discovery,
and node D is referred to as the target/destination of the Discovery.
If an intermediate node receives a RREQ for which it is not the target, it checks its route
cache to see it has a route to the destination/target of the RREQ. If it does not have an
entry in its local route cache, it adds its own IP address to the route record of the RREQ
packet and then it rebroadcasts the Route Request (RREQ) by forwarding the packets
along its outgoing links. This RREQ route record comprises a list of intermediate nodes
that have forwarded this RREQ up to this point including the source/originator node. To
limit the number of route requests propagated on the outgoing links of a node, a mobile
only forwards the route request if the request has not yet been seen by the mobile and if
the mobile’s IP address does not already appear on the route record. When the request
(RREQ) reaches the target/destination node, this list of hops (route record) in the RREQ
will be an indication of the path or sequence of hops along which this copy of the RREQ
was forwarded in the Route Discovery in order to reach the target/destination node from
the originator/source node. Figure 2.5(a) illustrates the formation of the route record as
the route request propagates through the network [10].
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Figure 2.5

Creation of the route record in DSR

A Route Reply packet is generated when the route request reaches either the destination
itself, or an intermediate node which contains in its route cache an un-expired route to the
destination/target. If it is the destination/target node, it places or encapsulates the
sequence of hops taken (route record) from the originator to itself (the destination) in the
packet header of a unicast Route Reply (RREP) Packet. The Route Reply (RREP) can in
general be routed along any path independent of the original route that was taken by the
Route Request (RREQ) packet to get to the target/destination node. This ability of the
Route Discovery in DSR allows unidirectional links to be supported (if allowed by the
specific MAC protocol in use on that link). The originator or source node on getting this
RREP, enters it into its route cache for possible use on subsequent packets while
immediately using the path discovered to commence the transmission it wanted to do, of
data to that destination/target node.
But if a Route Request (RREQ) reaches an intermediate node that has a route entry to the
target/destination node in its route cache, this intermediate node can reply, sending a
Route Reply (RREP) with a route to the target back to the originator/source. The
intermediate node will append it’s cached route to the route record and then generate the
route reply (RREP). By replying using the route from its route cache, the new route is
returned to the originator sooner, and the overhead of Route Discovery is reduced since
the RREQ need not be rebroadcasted. To return the route reply, the responding node must
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have a route back to the originator/source node. If it has a route to the source node in its
route cache, it may use that route. Otherwise, if symmetric links are supported, the node
may reverse the route in the route record. If the symmetric links are not supported, the
node may initiate its own route discovery and piggyback the route reply on the new route
request. Figure 2.6(b) shows the transmission of the route reply with its associated route
record back to the source node [10].
A node may also update its route cache based on source routes or other routing
information that it may glean from forwarding the packets it forwards for other nodes by
optionally operating its network interface hardware in a promiscuous receive mode.
There are a number of optimizations that improve the performance of this basic Route
Discovery mechanism detailed above. An example is the expanding ring searches. This is
a mechanism by which Route Requests (RREQ) may be limited by the Time To Live
(TTL) field in the IP header of the packet, control the extent of propagation of RREQ,
first from the local or one-hop immediate neighbors to larger areas.

Figure 2.6

DSR route discovery [34]
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Figure 2.7
2.6.3

Breakdown of DSR Route Discovery [36]

Route Maintenance

After Route Discovery, a source node originating a packet, in the header of the packet,
lists a route, with a complete list of hops through which the packet is to be forwarded. It
then sends the packet out to the target/destination. The originator or source node is then
responsible to confirm that the packet has been received by the first intermediate hop in
the route, retransmitting the packet if necessary until this confirmation is received. It can
retransmit until a maximum number of retransmission attempts have been performed.
Also, when the intermediate node receives the packet and sends it on along the route, it is
responsible in the same way for confirming if the packet has been received by the next
node in the packet route. The packet is retransmitted by the intermediate node if
necessary, just like the original sender.
This confirmation of receipt of the sent packet by the next hop can be obtained in two
ways. Confirmation can be achieved through a passive acknowledgement using the linklevel acknowledgement present in many wireless MAC protocols including IEEE 802.11
[8, 60]. Also, confirmation can be received through an explicit DSR acknowledgement
packet from the next hop if necessary.
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Route Error packets (RREP) are generated at a node when the data link layer encounters a
transmission problem. Hence, if confirmation is not received after a limited number of
retransmission attempts for the packet, the link from this node to the next hop will be
considered to have broken and a Route Error (RERR) Packet identifying and notifying
about this broken hop is returned to the originator/source node. When a route error packet
(RREP) is received, the hop in error is removed from the source node’s route cache and
all routes containing that hop in error are truncated at that point. It will then use an
alternate route to the same destination/target to re-send the packet or for subsequent
packet transmissions, if it has the alternate route already in its route cache. If no other
route exists in its route cache to the destination, it will invoke Route Discovery to
discover a new source route to the destination. In addition to route error messages,
acknowledgements are used to verify the correct operation of the route links. Such
acknowledgments include passive acknowledgements, where a mobile is able to hear the
next hop, forwarding the packet along the route.
As with Route Discovery, there are a number of optimizations that improve the Route
Maintenance performance of the protocol [5, 25]. One of which is a case where, an
intermediate node detects a broken link and returns a Route Error (RERR) to the source
node sender of a packet, the intermediate node may attempt to salvage the packet if it has
in its own route cache an alternate valid route to the packet’s target/destination. To
salvage, the intermediate node replaces the path in the original packet route with the
alternate route it has in its cache and then transmits the packet to the new next hop node.
Another optimization supported by DSR which helps in efficient Route Maintenance is
automatic route shortening. This allows source-destination routes in use to be shortened
when possible, for example, in a case, when nodes move close enough together so that
one or more intermediate hops are no longer necessary. Here, if a node is able to
promiscuously listen to a packet not intended for it as the next hop, but for which its own
node is listed in the unused portion of the packet’s source route, then this node can return
a Gratuitous Route Reply to the original sender of the packet (source node). This
gratuitous RREP will give the shorter route through that intermediate node that omits one
or more of the original intermediate nodes listed in the route been used for the
transmission, therefore offering a shorter path to the intended destination.
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2.6.4

DSR Optimizations

Several additional optimizations exist in the DSR protocol specifications. They are:
(i)

Salvaging: This is in the event of link failure or node dissociation. Here,
an intermediate node can use an alternate route from its own cache, to
successfully transmit data to a specified destination when a data packet
encounters a broken link on its source route.

(ii)

Gratuitous repair: Also this is a route or link repair optimization for
greater efficiency. Normally, in DSR, a source node is solely notified by a
Route Error Packet (RERR), when a link fails during the transmission of
data from the source node to a destination node. Gratuitous route repair
enhances the process by ensuring a source node, on receiving a RERR
packet sends the RERR back along the same path which it came to traverse
the same routes. This helps clean up the caches of other nodes in the
network that may have the failed link in one of their cached source routes.

(iii)

Promiscuous listening: This is the ability of nodes to overhear can receive
and process data and control packets that were not addressed to them at the
MAC layer, using it to gratuitously learn routing information for other
network destinations. Also, listening helps a node to learn different routes
without directly participating in the routing process.

(iv)

Gratuitous Route Reply (RREP): This optimization utilizes the
promiscuous listening feature. From the information a node gleans using
the promiscuous listening mode feature, it checks whether the packet could
be routed via itself to gain a shorter route. If so, the node sends a
gratuitous RREP to the source of the route with this new, better route.

2.6.5

Advantages of DSR

 There is a higher efficiency and reduced latency as a result of its support of
multipath routing, hence, in the event of a link breakage or route going invalid, the
source can utilize alternate routes from the route cache if available to prevent
another route discovery hence also conserving bandwidth.
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 Advantages of DSR include easily guaranteed loop-free routing, operation in
networks containing unidirectional links, and very rapid recovery when routes in
the networks change.
 Load balancing can be done using DSR as it allows the sender node to select and
control the route used for its own packets made possible by its support for
multiple routes. Also as the sender node can avoid duplicate hops in the routes
selected, all routes used are easily guaranteed to be loop-free.
 The number of overhead packets caused by DSR is scaled all the way to zero
when all nodes are approximately stationary with respect to each other and all
routes needed for current communication have already been discovered. This is
enabled by its lack of usage of any periodic routing advertisement or dependence
on any underlying protocols in the network.
 It utilizes only soft state in routing which allows the routing protocol to be very
robust to problems such as dropped or delayed routing packets or node failures. A
node in DSR that fails and reboots can easily rejoin the network immediately after
rebooting and if the failed node was involved in forwarding packets for other
nodes as an intermediate hop along one or more routes, it can resume this
forwarding immediately after rebooting, with no or minimal interruption to the
routing protocol.
 In an Ad hoc network, the use of source routing provides many advantages
including simplicity and flexibility [21].
 Differentiated treatment of different types or classes of packets for Quality of
Service (QoS) is possible since by having the source route in a packet’s header, all
routing decisions for a packet are made by the sender of the packet. It is possible
for the sender to use different routes for different packets (QoS), without requiring
coordination or explicit support by the intermediate nodes.
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2.6.6

Disadvantages of DSR

 As the current specification [45] for DSR does not contain any mechanism for
route entry invalidation or route-prioritization when faced with a choice of
multiple routes, this leads to stale cache entries, particularly at high mobility.
 DSR has the disadvantage of increased per-packet overhead. This is as a result of
source routing where the size of each packet is increased in order to carry the
source route of hops through which the packet is to be forwarded. The extra
network overhead caused by the presence of the source route is incurred not only
when the packet is originated, but also each time it is forwarded to the next hop.
This extra network overhead decreases the bandwidth available for transmission
of data, and consumes extra battery power in the network transmitter and receiver
node.
 Loss of data packets and wastage of network bandwidth exists in DSR as a result
of having no expiration of routes. Without an effective mechanism to remove
excessively old (stale) entries, route caches may contain broken or non-minimum
hop routes.
 There is also the security risk pertaining to DSR’s route maintenance mechanism.
A malicious node may misroute data packets without risking detection under the
guise of data salvaging optimization.
 DSR is not very scalable to large networks. Also, it requires more processing
resources as each node must spend more time processing any control data it
receives, even if it is not the intended recipient (promiscuous listening).

2.7

COMPARISION BETWEEN AODV AND DSR

According to protocol properties, we compare and contrast the characteristics and
mechanisms of AODV and DSR. This is detailed in table 2.1 and 2.2 below.

35

Table 2.1

Comparing Protocol Properties of AODV and DSR

Protocol Property

Ad-hoc On-Demand
Distance Vector (AODV)

Dynamic
(DSR)

Source

Routing

Multi-Path/ Multiple
Route capability

NO – Does not support YES – Supports
Multipath/Multicost routing
multipath/multicast routes

Uni-directional Link

NO – Does not support YES – Supports unidirectional
Unidirectional link routing
link routing

Scalability

YES – Scalable to large NO – Not scalable to large
networks
networks, best suited for
smaller networks

Distributed

YES

YES

Multicast

YES

NO

QoS Support
(Quality of Service)
Route
Reconfiguration

NO

YES

Route Information
Record

Uses ROUTE TABLES

Protocol Type

REACTIVE (using Distance- REACTIVE (using purely Link
Vector routing features)
State routing features)

Critical Nodes

NO

NO

Updates transmitted
to
Route Update
Mechanism

Neighbor Nodes

Neighbor Nodes

It adopts the use of Erases route and notifies source
SEQUENCE NUMBERS for
route maintenance & freshness
Uses ROUTE CACHE entries
to maintain routing information

HELLO
&
ROUTE BEACONLESS – Does not
BROADCASTS
–
which require hello transmissions.
contains
destination
IP
address, number of hops &
sequence number
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Frequency of
Updates
Multicast capability

PERIODIC AND
TRIGGERED
YES

Optimization

Concept of Expanding Ring Concept
of
Promiscuous
Search & Local repair of links listening, salvaging, gratuitous
and replies

Design and
Definition Standards
Proposal
Routing Philosophy

Uses RFC 3561 as
specification standard

Routing Metric

HOP COUNT using freshest HOP COUNT using shortest
and shortest path
path

FLAT

EVENT EVENT TRIGGERED
NO
Uses
transmissions more

unicast

its Uses RFC 4728 as a standard

FLAT
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Table 2.2

Differences between AODV and DSR

DSR

AODV

Uses Source Routing
It utilizes a Soft State approach in routing
Features based on Link State Routing
algorithm
It stores/records route information using
multiple route cache entries for a
destination
Does not support timer-based states

Uses a Table-Driven routing framework
Mainly Hard State routing
Mainly features from Distance Vector
algorithm
Stores/records route information as one
entry per destination route

Does not support hop by hop routing,
instead the packet carries the complete path
from source to destination, to be traversed
A set of predecessor nodes is maintained as
a list called route record in the headers of
Route Request Packets (RREQ)
Route Error Packets (RERR) are used to
inform the source node exclusively about a
route/link failure
DSR replies to all requests reaching a
destination from a single request cycle
DSR has access to a significant amount of
routing information using both its source
routing
and
promiscuous
listening
mechanism. With a single request-reply
cycle, the source can learn different routes
to each intermediate node on the route in
addition to the intended destination.

Each routing table entry has an associated
lifetime value
For routing transmission, it uses
intermediate nodes (hop by hop) and next
hop information corresponding to each
flow for packet forwarding
A set of predecessor nodes is maintained
for each routing table entry indicating
neighboring nodes that use or have used
that route to forward packets
Route Error Packets (RERR) are used to
inform all nodes using a link when the link
fails
In AODV on the other hand, the destination
replies only once to the request arriving
first and ignores the rest
AODV can gather only a limited amount of
routing information in the absence of
source routing and promiscuous listening.
This makes AODV to rely on route
discovery flood more often, which causes a
significant network overhead.
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CHAPTER THREE
EVALUATION OF MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND REVIEW
OF EXISTING WORK

3.1

EVALUATION OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS

This section summarizes and compares the results regarding existing research work done
on the routing protocols DSR, AODV and DSDV. In the existing work we used for the
evaluations here, the Network Simulator (NS-2) and above were predominantly utilized in
carrying out the researches. Comparing the results in the papers directly will not be
entirely accurate since the test environments and used protocol features do vary.
However, with that in mind, we ensure that the protocol behavior and performance
metrics is consistent between the works used for our evaluation. This will further give
credence to the results as the research, experiments and simulations where carried by
different people at different places and environments but ensuring the performance
metrics used are constant and the models employed relatively consistent. Distributed
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) sources were mostly used in all the existing studies evaluated
here with the random waypoint model as mobility model. The routing protocols are
compared on the metrics:
(i)

Throughput,

(ii)

Delay,

(iii)

Routing

Overhead,
(iv)

Energy Efficiency,

3.2

PERFORMANCE METRICS

3.2.1

Throughput

Defined based on a desired outcome, throughput can be explained as a ratio between
transmitted packets and delivered packets. Basically presented, it is the number of bits
transmitted between source and destination per unit time [59]. It is a measure of how
successful a protocol is in delivering packets from source to destination.
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………………..

(i)

Where n = number of received packets, and m is the number of sent packets and CBR =
Committed Bit Rate
3.2.2

Delay

This packet transmission protocol property is useful for establishing the responsiveness of
applications. There are however, two problems with the delay measurements. First, the
delay can only be computed using successfully received messages/packets (throughput
received) i.e. the throughput has to be acceptable for delay to be accurately considered.
Secondly, only the average delay is reported. Therefore, to be able to judge the usefulness
of delay when routing for delay sensitive applications (i.e streaming voice and video),
distribution of delay is worth considering too if feasible [59].
Generally, higher mobility and higher traffic load increase the delay. Also congestion
brings about higher delays even at low mobility. With congestion, delay can be higher at
low mobility than at medium mobility. Major part of the delay comes from queuing at
congested nodes. However, according to the existing comparison works done, we will be
evaluating delay as an average end-to-end delay of data packets. Average end-to-end
delay of data packets includes all possible delays caused by buffering during route
discovery latency, queuing at the interface queue, retransmission delays at the MAC,
propagation and transfer times.

…………

(ii)

Where n = number of received packets, and CBR = Committed Bit Rate
3.2.3

Routing Overhead

Routing protocols generate traffic as a result of their control packets which is needed to
get and maintain routes and network information. There are two common ways to
measure this traffic: (a) Number of packets and (b) Number of bytes. The cost to gain
access to the media dominates relative to the per byte transmission cost in contention
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based media access including wireless. That means, it is more important to reduce the
number of routing packets than the absolute routing data size.
Hence, Routing overhead can be said to be the ratio between the total numbers of routing
or control packets transmitted to data packets. That is, the number of routing packets
transmitted per data packet delivered at the destination. The routing load metric evaluates
the efficiency of the routing protocol.
……………

(iii)

Where n = number of received packets, and k is the number of routing packets.
3.2.4

Energy Efficiency

In real life systems, energy consumption is a major issue. For many Ad hoc networks, the
nodes are usually small and portable thereby imposing stringent constraints on the battery
size and power available. The source of energy consumption for each node in an Ad hoc
network is mainly the transmission and reception of both control and data packets. Since
the Ad hoc routing protocol determines which nodes will forward the packets and the
amount of routing overhead each node needs, the type of protocol definitely affects the
energy performance of the system. Other means of energy consumption such as when the
node is in listening mode or when the node is caching and filtering route information
were assumed equal and taken as constants [17, 18].
Throughput and Delay metrics are among the most important metrics for best traffic
forwarding. The routing load metric is an indication of the efficiency of a routing
protocol. However, it should be noted that these metrics are not completely independent
but rather do have a correlation to one another. Take for an example, a larger overhead
may cause lower throughput and longer delay. On the other hand, a shorter delay may not
necessarily imply a higher throughput, since delay is only measured on those successfully
delivered packets. Also of note is that the existing performance comparison work
evaluated here was tested and analyzed based on a random situation using random way
point traffic model. Real-world scenario Ad hoc networks usually do have special traffic
and mobility models. As different networks and applications have different scenarios, it is
difficult getting a model to satisfy exactly the varying scenarios.
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3.3

REVIEW OF EXISTING WORK MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Considering performance of routing protocols can be based on various mechanisms which
lead to differences in performance and operation, each routing protocol reacts differently
when evaluated using metrics and a mobility model. The mobility model of the work
utilized by the existing research work compared here is the random way point mobility
model. Also, the source of packets employed for those simulations are Constant Bit Rate
(CBR) sources.
According to Sabina Barakovic et al. [69] and the results of their simulation, the Reactive
Protocols (AODV & DSR) delivers over 95% of packets in all cases the considered.
Hence has a much higher throughput than Proactive Protocols. This is because proactive
protocols (i.e. DSDV) because of its table driven approach, is not as adaptive to route
changes that occur under high mobility as AODV and DSR protocols are. Between
AODV and DSR, DSR delivered the highest percentage of its packets hence has a higher
throughput for DSR under low mobility and significantly less under high mobility.
Also in all cases they considered in their simulation, regardless of mobility or source
number, DSR protocol generates significantly less routing load than AODV, OLSR and
DSDV protocols. Analyzing average end to end delay, they came to the conclusion that
DSR routing protocol outperforms AODV and DSDV protocols. This is attributed to its
use of source routing, aggressive caching and no dependence on periodical activities.
Overall, according to Sabina Barakovic et al [69] in high mobility cases, DSR protocol
performs better than AODV and DSDV protocols regardless of number of sources in the
network.
Azzedine Boukerche in [33] ascertained from his results that DSR has a very high
throughput, the highest amongst the protocols. In the delay studies, AODV outperforms
others delay-wise by exhibiting a very short end-to-end delay of data packets.
Furthermore, DSR was shown to have the smallest routing overhead than AODV, OLSR
and DSDV.
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From the works of Samyak Shah et al in [52], they showed that proactive protocols like
DSDV because of its table-driven approach is not as adaptive to the route changes that
occur hence are not suited perfectly for MANET which is a highly dynamic network.
Both AODV and DSR (reactive protocols) perform better under high mobility simulations
than DSDV. The general observation from their simulation is that for application-oriented
metrics such as throughput or packet delivery fraction and delay, AODV outperforms
DSR in more ‘stressful’ situations (i.e. smaller number of nodes and lower load and/or
mobility) with the performance gap widening with increasing stress(eg. More load, higher
mobility). The slightly poorer performances of DSR in those regards were mainly
attributed to a lack of any mechanism to expire stale routes or determine the freshness of
routes when multiple choices are available. DSR, however, consistently generates less
routing load than AODV. The major contribution to AODV’s routing over-head is from
route requests and periodic transmissions (hello), while route replies constitute a large
fraction of DSR’s routing overhead.
According to I.Vijaya et al in [59], both reactive protocols (AODV & DSR) performed
well in high mobility scenarios than proactive protocols as proactive protocols fail to
respond fast enough to changing topologies. In terms of throughput, DSR performs better
than AODV when the number nodes is less but its performance declines with increased
number of nodes due to more traffic in the network. The performance of AODV is
relatively consistent. For average end-to-end delay, the performance of DSR and AODV
are almost uniform with AODV having significantly the higher performance in delay as
the size of the network increases. They also deduced from their simulation results that
DSR consistently generates less routing load than other protocols (i.e AODV and DSDV).
Reactive protocol, DSR with the aggressive use of cache memory from the performance
evaluation of the routing protocols in [43] performs better than all the other protocols.
P.Chena Reddy et al [43] states from their simulation results, that in throughput, DSR
outperforms AODV and DSDV. In delay, AODV has the best (lowest) delay performance
with delay in DSR increasing under higher mobility conditions. Here also, DSR is also
stated to have the least routing overhead compared to AODV and DSDV.
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From [66], V.B. Narsimha concludes that received packets (throughput) for DSR are
much higher than that of DSDV and AODV. Higher throughput efficiency for the routing
protocols in descending order is – DSR, OLSR, AODV and DSDV. AODV is attributed
with the best delay (lowest latency) especially during higher network entropy. Also, DSR
is attributed with displaying the least routing overhead.
Charles E. Perkins, Elizabeth M. Royer et al [16] in their comparison of on-demand
routing protocols, also stated that DSR outperforms AODV for application oriented
metrics such as delay and throughput but mainly in low mobility and less congested
situations. AODV however outperforms DSR as the number of nodes in the networks
increases and with higher mobility. They agreed that DSR is consistent in having the least
routing load in all situations when compared to AODV.
One important aspect of Ad hoc networks that was ignored by many studies is energy
efficiency. Energy consumption and efficiency is a major issue for mobile Ad hoc
networks as the nodes have energy limitation due to their need for mobility and lack of
infrastructure. Cano and Manzoni[14] studied the routing energy consumption of the
protocols using the NS-2 simulator. In [14], they quantified the amount of energy used for
the routing overhead of AODV, DSR, TORA and DSDV under different scenarios. Their
simulation results showed that DSR outperforms AODV and DSDV in conservation or
energy efficiency. This can be attributed to its aggressive approach in promiscuous
listening and caching coupled with the ability to have little or no activity when not
forwarding data (no periodic/hello transmissions). In their research, it should be of note
that only the routing overhead energy used by the different protocols was compared while
still using the random way point mobility model and constant bit rate traffic generation.
Chandra S.R. Putta et al in [55] evaluated the performance of reactive (i.e. DSR and
AODV) and proactive (i.e. OLSR) routing protocols in 802.11 Ad hoc network
environment. They noticed that proactive protocols offer better performances for constant
bit rate (CBR) sources (e.g. Voice services) given that it guarantees lowest delay albeit in
a very low mobility network. However it consumes much more bandwidth performing
badly in throughput and routing overhead. The reactive routing protocols are more
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adapted for data services (file transfer). There was no clear winner among DSR and
AODV in throughput.

3.4

MODEL AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOL

Taking into cognizance, the evaluation and comparison of reactive (AODV, DSR) Ad hoc
routing protocols, it can be seen from the mechanisms and characteristics of the
respective protocols coupled with the evaluation experiments and simulations carried out
in existing works, that reactive (on-demand) routing protocols due to their on-demand
nature are best suited for the dynamism and mobility associated with MANETs.
DSR is purely an on-demand routing protocol unlike AODV which although on-demand,
still possess some proactive properties. DSR makes use of source routing which makes it
the best suited for the mobility and dynamism that comes with MANETs. Also apart from
the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of each routing protocol which we
discussed in detail in the earlier sections, comparative experiments and simulations
conducted strongly favor DSR as exhibiting the better performance on major MANET
performance metrics (better throughput, lower delay and lower routing overhead).
Therefore, DSR is used as our model MANET routing protocol in this work.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SECURITY

4.1

INTRODUCTION

Security in a MANET is an essential component for basic network functions like packet
forwarding and routing. The network operation can be easily jeopardized if
countermeasures are not embedded into the basic network functions at the early stages of
their design. Unlike conventional networks, the Ad hoc networks carry out basic support
functions like – packet forwarding, routing and network management of all of the
available nodes without having support of dedicated nodes and also the data has to travel
through an open medium [40].
Hence, security is an indispensable need for wireless network communications. In
contrast to wire-line networks, wireless networks pose a number of unique challenges to
security solutions due to their, unpredictable topology, wireless shared medium,
heterogeneous resources and stringent resource constraints etc.
In Ad hoc network, security is not a single layer issue but a multilayered one. A scrutiny
reveals that security concerns in MANETs involve two separate problems: secure routing
discovery and secure data transmission over the MANETs [50].

4.2

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AD HOC NETWORKS

One of the main challenges of MANETs comes from their open peer-to-peer architecture.
However, security challenges faced in Ad hoc Networks are possible because of [48]:


Vulnerability of Channels: Ad hoc network is like any wireless network. Because
of the medium which is of a wireless or radio spectrum, it is devoid of physical
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security. Hence basically, Ad hoc networks from the on-set, is at a disadvantage of
having negligible to zero physical layer protection ability. Therefore, the wireless
channel is accessible to both users and attackers. Use of wireless links, renders an
Ad hoc network susceptible to link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to
active impersonation, message replay, and message distortion. An adversary can
easily eavesdrop, delete messages and inject fake messages thus violating
availability, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation security goals of a
network, without the difficulty of having physical access to network components.


Vulnerability of Nodes: Ad hoc network nodes usually are mobile and unlike
traditional wire-line networks are not contained in physically protected places.
With relatively poor physical protection, nodes have a high probability of being
captured or compromised by an attacker. Therefore, this brings about that we
should not only consider malicious attacks from outside the network, but highly
take into account the likelihood of attacks being launched from within the network
by compromised nodes. Therefore, to achieve high survivability and availability,
Ad hoc networks should have a distributed architecture with no central entities.
Introducing any central entity into a security solution could lead to significant
vulnerability because if that centralized node is compromised, the entire network
is undermined.



Absence of Infrastructure: Ad hoc networks are devoid of pre-existing
infrastructure and are supposed to operate independently of any fixed
infrastructure. This makes the traditional and classical security solutions not quite
applicable as they have to be adapted to the dynamism and infrastructure-less of
the network. Also, this lack of support infrastructure may prevent the application
of standard techniques for key agreement.



Dynamically Changing Topology: As a result of the mobility expected of Ad hoc
networks, the constant changes in topology require sophisticated routing protocols
of which securing the already complex protocols is an additional challenge. A
highly noteworthy difficulty is that incorrect routing information can be generated
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by compromised nodes or as a result of some topology changes and it is hard
distinguishing between the two cases. Also because of the dynamism (i.e nodes
frequently join and leave the network), trust relationships among nodes also
change frequently and maybe too frequently to be valid and of use. Hence, it is
desirable for security mechanisms here, to adapt on the fly to these changes.
Finally, due to dynamically changing topology, the availability is not always
guaranteed.


Scalability: An Ad hoc network can consist of hundreds or even thousands of
mobile nodes. Although scalability is not directly related to security but, it is a
very important issue that has a great impact on security services. Security
mechanisms should be scalable to handle such a large network. Also as resource
constraints on nodes in Ad hoc networks limit the cryptographic measures that are
used for secure messages. Otherwise, the newly added node in the network can be
compromised by the attacker and used for gaining unauthorized access of the
whole system [56].

Table 4.1

Grouping Security Issues for MANETs into Layers of the OSI Model

Layer

Security Issues

Application Layer

Detecting and preventing viruses, worms, malicious
codes, and application abuses

Transport Layer

Authenticating

and

securing

end-to-end

communications through data encryption
Network Layer

Protecting the Ad hoc routing and forwarding
protocols

Link Layer

Protecting the wireless MAC protocol and providing
link-layer security support

Physical layer

Preventing signal jamming denial-of-service attacks
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4.3

SECURITY MEASURES OR SERVICES REQUIRED IN MANET

There are no ultimate solutions and remedy to all active and passive attacks as a unified
or end-to-end security solution. Most security threats and breaches are dealt case-by-case.
Security services are needed to be employed in securing a MANET. Security services
include the functionality required to provide a secure networking environment. The
security schemas that can solve the open challenges present in MANETs need to do so
within the stringent resource limitations in terms of computation capability, memory,
communication capacity, and energy supply. To secure an Ad hoc network, we consider
the following services: Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, and Nonrepudiation [13].

Availability:
This ensures the survivability of network services and making the resources of the
network available to other legitimate nodes regardless of the attacks that target the
network, especially denial of services or the existence of selfish nodes. A DOS attack
could be launched at any layer of an Ad hoc network. Frequency/Channel jamming can
be employed at physical and data link layers (Media Access Control sub-layer), to
interfere with communication on the physical channels which in the case of Ad hoc
network is radio wave spectrum. On the network layer, a malicious attacker could disrupt
or hijack the routing protocol operations and disconnect the network. For the higher
layers, such target can be the key management service, which is an essential service for
any security framework. Because communication in MANETs is based on cooperation
and coordination, the ability to reach all other nodes in a network is imperative.
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Table 4.2

Threats to Availability
Black Hole Attack

Threats to
Availability

Malware
Broadcast Tampering
Spamming
Greedy Drivers
Denial of Service

Consuming the Node Resources
Jamming the Channel
DDoS

Confidentiality:
Ensures that data/information transmitted over the network is kept secret and not
disclosed to unauthorized entities. Leakage of information in the network can be
disastrous, be it control information or data information. Routing information must also
remain confidential because the control information can be used maliciously in
identifying, locating and controlling of target nodes. Certain information like passwords
or keys must have a defense mechanism to protect them and encryption is a more popular
technique to achieve confidentiality. Confidentiality can be achieved by using different
encryption techniques such that only legitimate users or nodes can analyze and
understand the transmission.
Integrity:
It refers to prevention of any compromises that may happen to packets when they are
transmitted between nodes. The function of integrity control is to assure that the data is
received verbatim as sent, by the authorized party. This is a guarantee that the message
transmitted was not tampered or corrupted hence contains no modification, insertion or
deletion. Integrity offers little or no tolerance to any passive or active attacks that might
target the packets. For instance, a packet cannot be dropped, altered or replaced without
detection. As with confidentiality, integrity can apply to a stream of messages, a single
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message or selected fields within a message. The destruction of data is also covered under
integrity service. Therefore, it can be said to address both message stream modification
and denial of service (DOS).

Authentication:
Authentication is the ability to know the actual identity of other nodes. This service
verifies a user’s identity and assures the recipient that the message is from the source that
it claims to be from. It is also used to ensure a node’s identity when communicating or
about to communicate with a peer node. Without authentication, an adversary could
masquerade as a node, thus gaining unauthorized access to resources and information.
Impersonating to gain access to secured information is made futile by authentication. A
reliable authentication mechanism detects any impersonation and identifies all nonmalicious nodes and messages, which is a fundamental security requirement.
Authentication can be provided using encryption along with cryptographic hash
functions, digital signatures and certificates [1]. Authentication can also be used as a form
of access control of either a resource, host system or an application.

Table 4.3

Threats to Authentication
Masquerading

Threats to
Authentication

Replay Attack
GPS Spoofing
Tunneling
Sybil Attack
Message Tampering
ID Disclosure
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Non-repudiation:
This ensures that the origin of a message sent or received cannot be denied. Thus, when a
message is sent, the receiver can prove that the message was in fact sent by the alleged
sender while the sender can also prove that the message was received by the alleged
receiver. This is especially useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes.

4.4

ATTACKS IN MANETS

Mobile Ad hoc Networks depend heavily on the active cooperation of all nodes in order
to establish and operate the network. The basic assumption in such a setup is that all
nodes are well behaving and trustworthy. However, due to dynamic, distributed
infrastructure-less nature of MANETs, and lack of centralized authority, the Ad hoc
nodes are vulnerable to being compromised and open to various kinds of attacks. There is
a classification of attacker behavior into three major groups: [62] (i) Insider/Internal
versus Outsider/External; (ii) Malicious versus Rational; (iii) Active versus Passive
(based on methodology).
There are two levels of attacks to MANETs. Attacks on the basic functionality of the
MANET, such as routing and attacks on the information on transit.

4.4.1

Vulnerability of Existing Protocols

The main network layer operations in MANETs are Ad hoc routing and data packet
forwarding, which interact with each other and fulfill the functionality of delivering
packets from the source to the destination. Based on the routing states, data packets are
forwarded by intermediate nodes along an established route to the destination. All of the
routing protocols in MANETs depend on active cooperation of nodes to provide routing
between the nodes and to establish and operate the network. As they are the backbone of
any network, they are most targeted by attacker and very vulnerable due to the challenges
faced by Ad hoc networks. Malicious and selfish nodes are the ones that fabricate attacks
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against physical, link, network, and application layer functionality [31]. Current routing
protocols are exposed to two types of attacks: Passive and Active.
In passive attacks, the attacker does not send any message, but just listens to the channel.
Passive attacks are non-disruptive but they are information seeking which is also sensitive
and critical. A passive attacker listens to the channel and packets containing secret
information (e.g. IP address, data, location of nodes etc.) may be stolen, which violates
confidentiality. In a wireless environment, it is very difficult to detect passive attacks as it
does not produce any new traffic in the network and hardly alters any [58]. Passive
attacks are done by selfish nodes that aim to preserve energy for themselves by not being
involved in passing messages hence might cause partitioning of the networks and
decreased performance level of the networks.
Active attacks on the other hand involve actions performed by malicious nodes that are
destructive and have intrusive capabilities. The action of an active attacker includes:
injecting packets to invalid destinations into the network, deleting packets, modifying the
contents of packets, and impersonating other nodes which violates availability, integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation paradigm. However, contrary to passive attacks,
active attacks can be detected and eventually avoided by the legitimate nodes that
participate in an Ad hoc network [57].

4.4.2

Active Attacks:

 Denial of Service: It aims at the complete disruption of the routing function and
therefore, the entire operation of the Ad hoc network. The attacker floods the
nodes by constant advertisements or broadcasts, preventing the normal operation
of nodes to participate in the scheme. The flooded node will look unreachable
from the legitimate others. Specific instances of denial of service attacks can
include the routing table overflow and the sleep deprivation attack.
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 Black Hole Attack: In this attack, the adversary or malicious node injects false
route replies (RREP) in response to the route requests it receives, advertising itself
as having the shortest path to the destination node whose packets it wants to
intercept. These fake replies can be fabricated to divert network traffic through
the malicious node for eavesdropping, or simply to attract all traffic to it in order
to perform a denial of service attack by dropping the received packets.
Additionally, an attacker can advertise a zero metric for all destinations causing
the entire node’s neighbors to route packets through the attacker because of its
best metric thinking it has the best or closest route. Then the attacker will just drop
the packets and not forward them on.
Also, Black Hole attack is carried out due to a node exhibiting selfishness. A
selfish node wants to preserve its own resources while using the services of others
and consuming their resources. This can endanger the network by the node in a
bid to be selfish, will not participate in the operation of the MANET by not
executing packet forwarding instead just dropping packets routed through it,
hence a black hole attack.
 Gray Hole: This is where a node in an established MANET routing topology,
selectively drops packets with certain probability causing network distraction. It
can drop some specific ones while forwarding all the packets for other nodes. It
may also behave maliciously for some time period by dropping packets but switch
back to normal behavior later. A gray hole may also exhibit a behavior which is a
combination of the above two.
 Byzantine Attack: This is a network layer attack which occurs as a lack of
authentication and packets integrity. These attacks are perpetrated by a group of
intermediate nodes that compromise their intentions within a network,
deteriorating routing services through packet dropping, forwarding to invalid
paths, or just creating routing loops.
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 Partition: Partition divides the network into two sets, by breaking one group of
nodes from the other. In this network attack, the malicious node or group of
nodes, aims to partition the network to prevent one group of nodes from
contacting the other group, through injecting unreliable routing packets and
making the route busy until the partition is completed.
 Node Isolation Attack: This is an attack against the OLSR protocol [42]. The
purpose of this attack is to isolate a given node from communicating with other
nodes in the network. This is achievable by attackers preventing link information
of a specific node or a group of nodes from being spread to the whole network.
Therefore, other nodes who could not receive link information of these target
nodes will not be able to build a route to these target nodes and hence will not be
able to send data to these nodes.
 Wormhole Attack: This involves cooperation between two or more attacking
nodes. It is also referred to as Tunneling Attack. A tunneling attack is where two
or more nodes may collaborate to encapsulate and exchange messages between
them along existing data routes. This exploit gives the opportunity to a node or
nodes to short circuit the normal flow of messages in the network and controlled
by the two or more colluding attackers. Simply stated, the colluding malicious
nodes create a tunnel or a shortcut between them to be able to forward a packet to
each other. A wormhole shows a valid route to the destination but it always
tunnels the packet to its malicious partner’s node. These tunnels are extremely
difficult to detect.
 Session Hijacking: This is a transport layer attack. It focuses on TCP and takes
advantage of the frequency of the TCP (3 way) handshake. In MANETs, TCP
authentication only happens at the start of a session, so an attacker takes
advantage of the absence during the session and hijacks it to get an unauthorized
access to confidential information
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 Malicious Code: It is an attack on the application layer. It includes injecting of
viruses, spywares and worms to achieve goals of harming other nodes or getting
access to confidential information. This slows the network and finally damages it.
 Jellyfish Attack: The malicious node intrudes into the forwarding group in the
network and then unreasonably delays data packets for some amount of time
before forwarding them. It results in significantly high end-to-end delay and delay
jitter, therefore it degrades the performance of real-time applications.
 Spoofing: This is where a malicious node takes the identity of another. It alters the
vision of the network topology.
 Sybil Attack: Attacker pretends to have manifold identities or nodes. A node can
act as if it were a multiple number of nodes either by impersonation or simply
claiming false identities. Hence, sending messages containing different fabricated
source identities.
 Replay Attack: An attacker that performs a replay attack injects into the network,
routing traffic that has been captured previously. This attack usually targets the
freshness of routes, but can also be used to determine poorly designed security
solutions.
 Blackmail / Black list Attack: This attack is relevant and propagated against
routing protocols that use mechanisms for the identification of malicious nodes
and use a list (black list) to keep record of suspected malicious nodes. Nodes
usually keep information of perceived malicious nodes in a blacklist. Here, an
attacker may fabricate messages reporting a particular node as malicious to others
in the network in a bid for that particular node to be added to other nodes
blacklists hence isolating a legitimate node from the network [13]. The security
property of non-repudiation can prove to be useful in such cases since it binds a
node to the messages it generated.
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Table 4.4

Active Attacks

Type

Summary of Active and Passive Attacks on a MANET
Name

Description

Target

Denial of Service

Network bandwidth or resources are Data link layer
consumed by data floods triggered by
malicious nodes [61]

Spoofing

Malicious nodes disguised as another, N/A
which give them advantages they don’t
deserve

Black hole

Malicious nodes declare they have a Network layer
right path for packets. The packet in
the route gets consumed and
intercepted

Byzantine

Routing loops might be made, packets Network layer
forwarded to bad routes or dropping
packets by intermediate nodes

Rushing

A wormhole is formed between two Network layer
attackers then they rush route request
packets to the nodes that receive the
packet

Partition

When fake routes are created by a Network layer
malicious nodes to prevent nodes from
communicating

Wormhole

Setting a shortcut by two or more Network layer
malicious nodes that keep forwarding
packets

Sybil attack

When a malicious node represents one N/A
of multiple identities

Session
Hijacking

Session hijacking happens because Transport layer
authentication happens only at the start
of business

Malicious Code

Operating system or user application Application layer
gets attacked by viruses, Trojan horse,
worms, spywares which damages
network
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Passive Attacks
4.4.3

Eavesdropping

Attacker aims to get confidential Physical layer
information
during
the
communications

Interference and
jamming

Attacker sends malicious data along Physical layer
with the same signals to be
communicated

Traffic Analysis

Protocol engaging and provoked Data link layer
communication between nodes

Passive Attacks:

 Eavesdropping: This occurs on the physical layer. Nodes eavesdrop to obtain
confidential information about other nodes (eg. Passwords, public, and private
keys), without authorization. This attack is hard to detect in the MANET
environment.
 Interference and Jamming: It attacks the physical layer by sending signals with
same frequency as those between two specific nodes to create many errors and
random noise.
 Traffic Analysis: This is an attack on the data link layer where the attacker obtains
information about the network such as location of nodes and their roles, the
topology of the network and the message routes. Through this attack, the privacy
requirements of an Ad hoc network are compromised.

4.5

ATTACKS TARGETING DSR ROUTING PROTOCOL

With our focus on vulnerabilities and exposures that result from the specification of the
Ad hoc routing protocols and not from problems with the IEEE 802.11 [21,22,85]. The
current standard routing protocols for mobile Ad hoc networks allow for many different
types of attacks. Though, the same attacks exist in wire-line networks [5], but they are
more easily defended against by the infrastructure present in a wire-line network.
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Also, as trivial denial of service attacks based on interception and non-cooperation are
possible in all Ad hoc routing protocols, they are not achieved through destabilization or
undermining of the routing protocol. However, all attacks targeting Ad hoc routing
protocols can be broadly classified into Modification, Impersonation, and Fabrication.

4.5.1

Attacks Using Modification

Malicious nodes can cause redirection of network traffic and DoS attacks by altering
control message fields or by forwarding routing messages with falsified values. As an
example, in the network in the figure below, a malicious node M could keep traffic from
reaching X by advertising a shorter route to X than the route to X that C advertises.

Figure 4.1

A Simple Ad hoc Network

 Redirection with modified hop counts: This attack is possible by modification of
the hop count field in route discovery messages. DSR uses hop count field as a
metric to determine the shortest path. In DSR, malicious nodes can tamper and
modify the hop count field of the RREQ during route discovery. As DSR uses
source routing, keeping track of nodes traversed, a malicious node on passing
through can modify the RREQ header, inserting or removing nodes to accomplish
a diversion and routing through another route.
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 Denial of Service with modified source routes: As DSR utilizes source routes
which explicitly states routes traversed or to be traversed in the packets headers, a
simple denial of service attack can be launched in DSR by altering the source
routes in packet headers as these routes lack integrity check mechanisms. From
the figure 4.2, assuming the path from S to X is the shortest path, and that M is a
malicious node attempting a denial of service attack. When S wants to
communicate with X and S has an unexpired route to X in its route cache, S will
transmit a data packet toward X, with the source route SABMCDX
contained in the packet’s header. When M the malicious node receives the packet,
it can alter the source route in the packet’s header inserting or even deleting for
instance D from the source route. This brings about that on C receiving the altered
packet and attempting to forward the packet to X, it will not find a next hop node
on the source route contained in the packet header and subsequently will have to
drop the packet making the transmission unsuccessful.

Figure 4.2

Another Example of an Ad hoc Network

Although DSR provides a route maintenance mechanism which is that a node
forwarding a packet is responsible to confirm that the packet has been received by
the next hop along the route path and if no confirmation of receipt is received,
there should be a retransmission of the packet a specified maximum number of
times. If still, there is no confirmation of receipt from the next hop, this node
should return an error message RERR to the source node. Therefore, in the case of
fig 4.2, C would send a route error message to S, but since M would be the first
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hop the RERR message takes on its way back to the source node S, M can
continue its denial of service attack by dropping this route error message. This
assumes that C only knows of the erroneous route to X, of which the DoS attack
can be totally successful. This assumption is as a result that DSR has a route
maintenance mechanism called route salvaging for the recovery from broken links
along a path by the node immediately upstream checking its route cache for a
different route to the destination. Also, modifications to source routes in DSR can
introduce loops in the specified path.
 Tunneling: As already discussed, a tunneling attack is where two or more nodes
may collaborate to encapsulate and exchange messages between them along
existing data routes while giving a false representation of the routing path. Figure
4.3 illustrates such a tunneling attack where M1 and M2 are malicious nodes
carrying out a tunneling attack by collaborating to misrepresent available path
lengths by tunneling route request packets (RREQ in DSR source routing). The
darker solid lines denote actual paths between nodes, the thin colored lines denote
the tunnel and the dotted lines denote the path falsely claimed by M1 and M2 is
between them.

Figure 4.3

Path Lengths Spoofed By Tunneling
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Here, a node S wishing to send or communicate with a destination node D,
initiates a route discovery. The source node S, sends out RREQs to its immediate
neighbors. When M1 receives a RREQ from S, M1 encapsulates the RREQ and
tunnels it to M2 through an existing data route, in this case {M1ABCM2}.

When M2 receives the encapsulated RREQ, it forwards the RREQ onto D as if

it had only travelled through this path {SM1M2D}. Neither M1 nor M2 will
update the packet header to reflect that the RREQ also traveled through the path
{ABC}. After route discovery, it appears to the destination that there are two
routes from the source node S to the destination D, of unequal hop length –
{SABCD} and {SM1M2D}. Hence S would erroneously consider
the path to D via M1 a better choice (in terms of hop counts) than the path to D
through A.

4.5.2

Attacks Using Impersonation or Spoofing

This attack occurs when a node misrepresents its identity in the network. This can be by
altering its MAC or IP address in egress packets and can be easily combined with
modification attacks.

 Routing Loops by Spoofing: Using figure 4.4, assuming paths exists between the
five nodes illustrated towards a remote destination, X, and also amongst
themselves as shown. In this illustration, A can hear B and D; B can hear A and C;
D can hear A and C; and C can hear B, D, and E. While, M can hear A, B, C, and
D; with E hearing C and the next hop on the route toward X.
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Figure 4.4 (a)

Figure 4.4 (b)

Figure 4.4 (c)

Figure 4.4

A sequence of events that form loops by spoofing of packets

In DSR, as a result of the promiscuous listening optimization, a malicious
attacker, M, can learn this topology by gleaning information from the
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RREQ/RREP exchanges during route discovery. To deploy a looping attack, M
moves out of range of node A while moving closer to node B, then changes its
MAC address to match A’s MAC. It will then send an RREP to node B that
contains a hop count to X that is less than the one sent by C (i.e a metric/hop
count of zero). Finding a route with a lower hop count, B therefore will change its
route to the destination, X, to go through A as illustrated in fig 4.4(b). Having
achieved that, M will then change its MAC address to match B’s while out of
range of B and closer to C. It will then send to C an RREP with a hop count of X
lower than what was advertised by E. C then routes to X through B, as shown in
figure 4.4(c). At this point a loop is formed and X is unreachable from the four
nodes.
 Partition Attack through Spoofing: This is carried out exactly as discussed in the
routing loops by spoofing section. The network becomes inadvertently divided
into partitions as illustrated in figure 4.4(c).

4.5.3

Attacks Using Fabrication

Attacks can be carried out in MANETs by generation and propagation of false routing
messages. Such attacks can be difficult to verify and isolate from non-malicious routing
messages. This is especially tenable in fabricated route error messages RERR that claim a
break in communication with a neighbor.
 Falsifying Route Errors in DSR: DSR implements path maintenance to recover
broken paths when the nodes of MANETs move. If it is the source node that
moved and the route is still needed, a route discovery is re-initiated with the
generation and transmission of route request RREQ messages. However, if it is
the destination node or an intermediate node along an active path that moves, the
node upstream of the link break will broadcast a route error message RERR to all
active upstream neighbors while invalidating the route for that destination in its
route cache. With no security mechanism in place, this creates vulnerability in the
routing operation of the MANET such that false route error messages can be sent.
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Using figure 4.5, where a node S has a route to node X via nodes A, B, C, and D.
A malicious node M can launch a denial of service attack against X by sending
route error messages to B, indicating a broken link between node C and node X,
all the while impersonating node C. Node B will then receive the message
thinking it came from C. Node B will then delete its routing cache entry for X and
forwards the route error message on to node A, who then deletes its routing cache
entry. Hence M can successful prevent communications (DoS) between S and X
using falsified RERR packets in conjunction with spoofing.

Figure 4.5

Ad hoc Network – Fabrication

 DSR Route Cache Poisoning: Route cache poisoning which is basically a
corruption of the routing state is a passive attack against routing integrity. This
occurs when entries or information stored in route caches at the nodes are either,
deleted, altered or injected with false information. Although this is obtainable in
wire-line networks, but it can often be easily defended against by security
measures at the routers due to the existing infrastructure. In DSR, in addition to
learning routes from headers of packets that a node is processing along a path,
routes in DSR may also be learned through promiscuous listening. For example in
figure 4.8, of which a path exists from node S to node X via nodes A,B,C, and D.
If a packet traveling along the source route from S to X is overheard by another
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node, that node may then add the route {S,A,B,C,D,X} to its route cache. This
promiscuous method of learning routes could easily be exploited by an attacker to
poison route caches. For an instance, if a malicious node M wanted to poison
routes to node X, M can broadcast spoofed packets with source routes to X via
itself. Neighboring nodes using promiscuous listening, overhears the packet
transmission, may add the route to their route cache. As can be observed, this is a
vulnerability that can be utilized to corrupt and destabilize the routing operations
and state of a MANET.

66

CHAPTER FIVE
REVIEW OF EXISTING SECURE MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK
PROTOCOLS

There exist several proposals that attempt to architect a secure routing protocol for Ad
hoc networks to offer protection against security attacks on MANETs. These proposed
solutions are either completely new stand-alone protocols, or in some cases
incorporations of security mechanisms into existing protocols (eg. DSR and AODV) [26].
A common design principle in all the examined proposals have a trade-off balance
between performance and security. Since routing is an essential function of Ad hoc
networks, the integrated security procedures should not hinder its operation. Another
important part of the analysis is the examination of the assumptions and the requirements
on which each solution depends. As can be seen, the design of these solutions focuses on
providing countermeasures against specific attacks, or set of attacks.
The existing work done in developing the solutions in the form of secure MANET
protocols can be classified into five categories:


Solutions based on asymmetric cryptography;



Solutions based on symmetric cryptography;



Hybrid solutions;



Reputation-based solutions; and



A category of add-on mechanisms that provide security for existing Ad
hoc routing.

However, this classification is not rigid since many solutions can be classified into more
than one category.
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5.1

ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY SOLUTIONS

Protocols that use asymmetric cryptography to secure routing in mobile Ad hoc networks
require the existence of a certification authority or a universally trusted third party (TTP).
The TTP will have a duty of issuing certificates that bind a node’s public key with a
node’s persistent identifier. Also, the TTP can be online in the network or offline. Both
approaches have different requirements and advantages. In the use of an online TTP,
revocation of the issued certificates is accomplished by broadcasting certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) in the network. Asymmetric Cryptography solution category is
made up of only one protocol, ARAN. However, many other protocols presented in other
categories use asymmetric cryptography in a way or the other, while having similar
requirements and limitations.

5.1.1

Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN):

The Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) protocol was proposed in [19]
as a stand-alone solution for security routing in MANETs in an on-demand routing
fashion based on AODV. ARAN achieves security goals of authentication and nonrepudiation through the utilization of cryptographic certificates. ARAN can be said to
consist of three operational stages.
The first stage is the certification process that requires the existence of a trusted
certification authority (CA). Each node, before joining the Ad hoc network, must contact
the certification authority and request a certificate for its address and public key with an
assumption of the protocol believing each node knows a priori the public key of the
certification authority.
The second operational stage of the protocol is the route discovery process which
provides end-to-end authentication. This ensures that the intended destination was
reached. The route discovery of the ARAN protocol begins with a node broadcasting a
route discovery packet (RDP) to its neighbors. The RDP includes the certificate of the
initiating node, a nonce, a timestamp, and the address of the destination node. Also the
initiating node signs its digital signature on the RDP. On its way forward, each
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intermediate node that receives it, validates the signature with the certificate, updates its
routing table with the neighbor from whom it received the RDP, signs it, and forwards it
to its neighbors after removing the certificate and the signature of the preceding node (but
not that of the initiator’s signature and certificate). The signature prevents malicious
nodes from injecting arbitrary route discovery packets that alter routes or form loops [37].
The destination node eventually receives the RDP and replies with a reply packet (REP).
The REP contains the address of the source node, the destination’s certificate, a nonce
and the associated timestamp. The destination node digitally signs the REP with its
private key prior to transmitting it. The REP is forwarded back to the initiating node by a
process similar to the process described for the route discovery (RDP), with the exception
that the REP is unicasted not broadcasted along the reverse path. The source node on
receipt is able to verify that the destination node actually sent the REP by checking the
nonce and the signature.
ARAN ensures end-to-end authentication, replay attack protection, and non-repudiation
but at the cost of a slightly higher latency.

5.2

SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS

This category is for solutions that rely solely on symmetric cryptography in securing the
routing function in MANETs. The most commonly utilized mechanisms are hash
functions and hash chains. A one-way hash function is a function that takes an input of
arbitrary length and returns an output of fixed length [38]. Hash functions have the
property of being computationally expensive to reverse, i.e. if
difficult to compute m such as

, it will be

. There are several well-known hash functions

that possess these properties including SHA-1 and MD5 [19, 30]. A hash chain can be
generated by applying repeatedly a given hash function to a random number which can be
called the root of the chain. Simply state, in order to generate a hash chain of length n, a
hash function is applied n times to a random value p, and the final hash q that is obtained
is referred to as the anchor of the chain [22]. In order to use a hash chain for
authentication purposes, an initial authenticated element of the chain is assumed, usually
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the anchor. This is so, because, it is possible to verify the authenticity of the elements that
come later in the sequence. Hash functions are especially lightweight when compared to
other symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations, hence why they have been
extensively used in the context of securing Ad hoc routing, and specifically in hop count
authentication and integrity.
5.2.1

Secure Routing Protocol (SRP):

The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) is a set of security extensions that can be applied to
any Ad hoc routing protocol that utilizes broadcasting as its route querying method [32].
DSR is particularly favored as the appropriate protocol for incorporating the proposed
security extensions by the authors of SRP. The operation of SRP requires the existence of
a security association (SA) between the source node initiating a route query and the
destination node. A shared secret key between the two (source node and destination) is
used by SRP of which the security association (SA) can be utilized in establishing it.
The SRP protocol appends an SRP header to the packet of the base routing protocol. The
source node sends a route request with a query sequence (QSEQ) number which is used
by the destination to identify outdated requests. Also sent is a random query identifier
(QID) that is used to identify the specific request, and the output of a keyed hash function.
Figure 5.1

SRP Packet Header

The changeable fields of the request, like the accumulated addresses of intermediate
nodes, are transmitted in the clear. The query is dropped if it has the same QID with an
entry in an intermediate node’s routing table. The intermediate nodes after receiving the
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query, updates their routing tables then broadcast the query to their neighbors. On receipt,
the destination node confirms that the query is not outdated or replayed through the
QSEQ, and verifies its integrity and authenticity through the calculation of the keyed
hash. In response, the destination node will generate a number of replies with different
routes corresponding at most to the number of its immediate neighbors. This is the
mechanism employed in SRP as an additional protection against route modification by
malicious nodes.
A route reply consists of the path from the source to the destination, the QSEQ and QID
numbers. The source node checks the QSEQ and QID numbers of the reply in order to
verify that they correspond to the active query, also comparing the IP source route with
the reverse of the route in the payload of the reply, and if they match it calculates the
MAC.
Route maintenance is achieved in SRP by route error messages that are source-routed.
However, this approach is not a guarantee against a malicious node fabricating the route
error packets.

5.2.2

Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector Routing:

This is a secure Ad hoc network routing protocol based on the design of the DestinationSequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) algorithm [13].

The SEAD routing protocol

employs the use of hash chains to authenticate hop counts and sequence numbers.
Creating a hash chain is by applying repeatedly a one-way hash function to a random
value. The elements of such a chain are used to secure the updates of the routing protocol.
SEAD requires the existence of an authentication and key distribution scheme in order to
authenticate one element of a hash chain between two nodes. With this authenticated
element, a node is able to verify later elements in the chain [37].
When a node transmits a routing update, it includes one value from the hash chain for
each entry in the update message. Moreover, it includes the address of the destination
node, the metric and the sequence number of the destination (from its routing table), and a
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hash value equal to the hash of the hash value received when it learned the route to the
destination. This hash value can be authenticated by the nodes that receive this routing
update since they have an already authenticated element of the same hash chain. This
mechanism allows other nodes only to increase the metric in a routing update but not to
decrease. To avoid denial of service attacks, a receiving node can specify the exact
number of hashes it is willing to perform for each authentication.
A node on receiving a routing update verifies the authentication of each entry of the
message. The hash value of each entry is hashed the correct number of times and it is
compared to the previously authenticated value. From the outcome of the comparison, the
routing update is either accepted as authenticated or discarded.
The SEAD routing protocol proposes two different methods in order to authenticate the
source of each routing update. The first method requires clock synchronization between
the nodes that participate in the Ad hoc network, and employs broadcast authentication
mechanisms such as TESLA [37]. The second method requires the existence of a shared
secret between each pair of nodes. This secret can be utilized in order to use a message
authentication code (MAC) between the nodes that must authenticate a routing update
message.
In SEAD, elements of the hash chain are used in succession to authenticate the entries in
the transmitted routing messages, given that an initial authenticated element exists. The
hash chains have a finite size and must be generated again when all their elements have
been used.

5.2.3

Ariadne:

It is a secure on-demand Ad hoc routing protocol. Security in Ariadne[68] follows an
end-to-end approach, while the SEAD protocol employs hop-by-hop security mechanisms
[37]. Ariadne is based on DSR and developed by the authors of the SEAD. It assumes the
existence of a shared secret key between the nodes and uses a message authentication
code (MAC) in order to authenticate point-to-point messages between these nodes [12].
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Also, Ariadne employs the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol to authenticate
broadcast messages such as route requests. Therefore, time synchronization is an absolute
requirement of Ad hoc networks that use Ariadne.
In a route request, a node includes its own address, the address of the destination node, a
number (ID) that identifies the current route discovery, a TESLA time interval that
denotes the expected arrival time of the request to the destination, a hash chain consisting
of its address, the destination address, the ID and the time interval, as well as two empty
lists – a node list and a MAC list. A neighboring node checks the validity of the TESLA
time interval when it receives the route request. A packet with an invalid time interval is
discarded. A valid time interval is one that the time is not too far in the future and its
corresponding key must not have been disclosed yet. For a valid time interval, the current
node inserts its address in the node list, replaces the hash chain with a new one consisting
of its address including the old one while appending a MAC of the entire packet to the
MAC list [24]. It then re-broadcasts the route request to its own neighbors. Note that the
MAC is calculated using the TESLA key that corresponds to the time interval of the
request.
The destination node checks the validity of the route request on receipt of it. The
destination generates and broadcasts a route reply packet for every valid route request it
receives. A valid route request is one that its keys from the specified time interval have
not been disclosed yet, and the included hash chain can be verified. A route reply contains
the same fields with the corresponding route request, and additionally it contains a target
MAC field and an empty key list. The reply is forward back to the source node by
following the reverse of the route included in the node list, as specified by the DSR
protocol. An intermediate node that receives the route reply waits until the specified time
interval allows it to disclose its key, which it appends to the key list and forwards the
message to the next node. This waiting technique of Ariadne, injects a lot of latency into
the process and creates room for the possibility of delay attacks. However, upon receiving
the route reply, the source node verifies the validity of every key in the key list, the target
MAC and of every MAC in the MAC list. This also increases the cost of Ariadne because
of the complexity of this operation.
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The Ariadne protocol also specifies a mechanism for securing route maintenance. This is
achieved by a node generating a route error message to report broken links while
including TESLA authentication details in the message. Therefore, every node that
forwards the route error toward the destination of the message is able to authenticate it
[27].

5.3

HYBRID SOLUTIONS

The secure routing protocols that fall into this category utilize both symmetric and
asymmetric cryptographic operations. The most common approach is the use of digital
signatures to provide integrity and authentication and also MAC, hashing and encryption
to protect the metric.

5.3.1

Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV):

Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) is a proposal for security
extensions to the AODV protocol [7]. It utilizes digital signatures and hash chains to
secure AODV packets. Cryptographic signatures are used for authenticating the nonchangeable fields of the messages, while a new one-way hash chain is created for every
route discovery process to secure the hop-count field in an AODV message. SAODV
requires the existence of a key management mechanism that enables a node to acquire and
verify the public key of other nodes.
To facilitate the transmission of the information required for the security mechanisms,
SAODV applies changes to the standard AODV message format in the form of
extensions. These SAODV extensions consist of the following fields: hash function field
which identifies the one-way hash function that is used; Max hop count which is a counter
that specifies the maximum number of nodes a packet is allowed to go through; Top hash
field is the result of the application of the hash function to a randomly generated number;
finally, the hash field is that random number. These are shown in figure 5.2 below.
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Type

Length

Hash function

Max Hop Count

Top Hash
Signature
Hash

Figure 5.2

SAODV Protocol Header

A node transmitting a route request or a route reply in an AODV packet, sets the max hop
count field equal to the time to live (TTL) field from the IP header. It generates a random
number and sets the hash field equal to it, then applies the hash function specified by the
corresponding max hop count field to the random number and stores the calculated result
to the top hash field. The node digitally signs all fields of the message, except the hop
count field from the AODV header and the hash field from the SAODV extension header.
On receipt of a route request or route reply by an intermediate node, it must verify the
integrity of the message using the digital signature and also verify the hop count AODV
field. Before the packet is re-broadcast by the intermediate node, the value of the hash
field is replaced by the result of the calculation of the one-way hash of the field itself in
order to account for the new hop. Here in SAODV, it still allows for intermediate nodes
with fresh routes to reply to a route query on behalf of the destination node only if the
reply is signed on behalf of the destination node.
For route maintenance, the route error messages (RERR) generated in SAODV by nodes
to inform neighbors of inability to route messages to specific destinations are secured
using digital signatures. A node generating or forwarding a route error message signs the
whole message, except the destination sequence numbers [7]. Since the destination does
not authenticate the destination sequence number, SAODV specifies that a node should
never update the destination sequence numbers of the entries in its routing table based on
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route error messages. Even with this requirement, route error messages are still useful in
SAODV as it allows a node to decide whether to completely remove a route from its
routing table or not.

5.4

REPUTATION BASED SOLUTIONS

Reputation based solutions operation usually relies on passive monitoring of transactions
and exchange of recommendation or alert messages between nodes that participate in a
system. The main purpose of reputation systems is to make decisions regarding
trustworthy entities and to encourage behavior that leads to increasing trust [9, 39].
Several reputation mechanisms have been proposed to address the problem of selfish
behavior and disruption of the routing process in MANETs including the Watchdog and
Path-rater concept.

5.4.1

Watchdog and Path-rater:

This scheme consists of two extensions to the DSR routing protocol that attempt to detect
and mitigate the effects of nodes that do not forward packets although they have agreed to
do so [11]. This misbehaviour may be due to malicious or selfish intent, or simply the
result of resource overload.
The watchdog extension is responsible for monitoring that the next node in the path
forwards data packets by listening in promiscuous mode. It identifies nodes that fail to do
so as suspicious nodes.
The path-rater assesses the results of the watchdog and selects the most reliable path for
packet delivery. One of the base assumptions of this scheme is that malicious nodes do
not collude in order to circumvent it and perform sophisticated attacks against the routing
protocol.
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Every node that participates in the Ad hoc network employs the watchdog functionality in
order to verify that its neighbors correctly forward packets. Furthermore, if there is no
link encryption employed in the network, the listening node can also verify that the next
node did not modify the packet before transmitting it [37]. The watchdog of a node
maintains copies of recently forwarded packets and compares them with the packet
transmissions overhead by the neighboring nodes. Positive comparisons result in the
deletion of the buffered packet and the freeing of the related memory. Every node in the
Ad hoc network, maintains a rating, assessing the reliability of every other node from
which it can overhear packet transmissions. Therefore, if a node that was supposed to
forward a packet fails to do within a certain timeout period, the watchdog of an
overhearing node increments a failure rating for the specific node. A node is identified as
misbehaving or malicious when the failure rating exceeds a certain threshold bandwidth
and the source node of the route that contains the offending node is notified by a message
sent by the identifying watchdog [11]. The main issue with this approach is its
vulnerability to blackmail attacks.

The path-rater extension to DSR selects routes for packet forwarding based on the
reliability rating assigned by the watchdog mechanism. Particularly, a metric for each
path is calculated by the path-rater by averaging the reliability ratings of the nodes that
participate in the path. This path metric allows the path-rater to compare the reliability of
available paths. The path-rater selects the path with the highest metric when there are
multiple paths for the same destination node. When the path-rater calculates a path value
as negative, this means that the specific path has a participating misbehaving node.
The watchdog and path-rater extensions as discussed facilitate the identification and
avoidance of misbehaving nodes that participate in the routing function. The main
operational assumption besides the support of promiscuous mode by the participating
nodes is that there is no collusion between active attackers in the network. Also, since the
system does not use cryptographic methods for securing exchanged messages, Watchdog
and Path-rater suffers from the possibility of blackmail attacks.
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5.5

ADD-ON MECHANISMS TO EXISTING PROTOCOLS

These are add-on mechanisms that address specific security problems in Ad hoc routing
and can be implemented into already existing protocols without modifying the protocols.
IPsec has been suggested as a possibility for securing Ad hoc routing.

5.6

COMPARISONS OF THE EXISTING PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING
FOR MANETs

As each protocol has a different set of operational requirements and provides protection
against different attacks by utilizing particular approaches, a comparison can provide
insight regarding the applicability of a particular protocol for a specific application
domain. In this section, we present the assumptions and operational requirements of the
analyzed protocols, and compare them based on the approaches they utilized.

5.6.1

Requirements and Assumptions of the Existing Proposed Secure Solutions

Certain assumptions and operational requirements form the basis of the proposed
solutions by the surveyed protocols. Most of the protocols require the existence of an
online trusted third party like a certification authority, in order to facilitate the acquisition
and verification of the public keys of the nodes that participate in the Ad hoc network.
ARAN, SEAD, and SAODV. The operational requirement of SRP is similar since it
needs a pre-established security association between every source and destination node.
The SEAD protocol requires the existence of a key distribution scheme for the
authentication of one element of a hash chain between two nodes, which can be realized
with a broadcast authentication mechanism such as TESLA, hence requiring the nodes of
the network to have synchronized clocks. Ariadne requires both shared secret keys
between each pair of nodes to authenticate point-to-point messages, and time
synchronization in order to use TESLA as a method for authenticating broadcast
messages. Finally, the successful operation of the Watchdog and Path-rater protocol
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extensions require that no two or more malicious nodes collude to perform routing
attacks. Table 5.1 summarizes the results of the comparison.

Table 5.1

Operational Requirements for the existing Secure Ad hoc Protocols

Proposed Solution

Requirements

ARAN

Online trusted certification authority. Each node knows a
prior the public key of the CA

SEAD

Clock synchronization, or a shared secret between each pair
of nodes

SRP

Existence of a security association between each source and
destination node. Malicious nodes do not collude within one
step of the protocol process

SAODV

Online key management scheme for the acquisition and
verification of public keys

Ariadne

Clock synchronization and the existence of a shared secret
between each pair of nodes. Also, an authentic TESLA Key
for each node and which are distributed via an online key
distribution center

Watchdog and Path-rater

No collusion between malicious nodes

Most of the security solutions for Ad hoc routing are based on existing security solutions
for Ad hoc routing are based on existing Ad hoc routing protocols. These base or
underlying protocols introduce parameters that must be taken into account. Table 5.2
presents a complete set of these.
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Table 5.2

Existing Secure MANET Routing Protocols Parameters

Proposed
Solution

Routing
Approach

Loop
freedom

Routing
Metric

ARAN

On-

Yes

None

Shortest
Intermediate
path
nodes allowed
identification to reply to
route requests
Optional
No

Yes

Distance

No

Optional

Yes

Distance

No

No

Yes

Distance

No

No

Yes

Distance

No

Optional

Yes

Path
reliability or
distance

Depends

Yes

demand
SRP

Ondemand

SEAD

Tabledriven

Ariadne

Ondemand

SAODV

Ondemand

Watchdog
and
Pathrater

Ondemand

Ideally, a secure Ad hoc routing protocol should be able to provide protection against all
the categories of attacks discussed in this work. However, in reality, with the highly
dynamic nature of Ad hoc networks and the different scenarios of their application, it is
difficult to design a general solution that can provide adequate protection against all kinds
of attacks in all possible application scenarios, possessing acceptable requirements and
overhead. Table 5.3 below provides a comparison of the surveyed secure routing
solutions with respect to the different attacks.
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Table 5.3

Defense Against Attacks
Protocols

Attacks

ARAN

SRP

SEAD

Ariadne

SAODV

Location Disclosure

No

No

No

No

No

Watchdog
and
Pathrater
No

Black Hole

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Replay

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Wormhole

No

No

No

No

No

No

Blackmail

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

No

Denial of Service

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Routing table
poisoning

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

81

CHAPTER SIX
PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL

6.1

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF A SECURE AD HOC ROUTING
PROTOCOL

A good secure routing algorithm should prevent each of the attacks presented and
discussed in the section above. It must ensure successful and secure route discovery and
maintenance with no node prevent or hindering it apart from the possibility of nonparticipation. A secure Ad hoc routing protocol must satisfy some requirements to ensure
the correct and safe functioning of routing operations and path discovery in the presence
of malicious adversaries:
1. Routing signaling cannot be spoofed
2. Fabricated routing messages cannot be injected into the network
3. Routing messages should and cannot be altered in transit, except according
to the normal functionality of the routing protocol
4. Routing loops cannot be formed through malicious action
5. Routes cannot be redirected from the best path (shortest path) by malicious
action
6. Unauthorized nodes should be excluded from route computation and
discovery. This does not overlook the fact that already authenticated peers
may act maliciously too. However, we assume that in managed –open
environment, there is some pre-deployment and exchange of public keys,
session key or certificates.
7. The network must never be exposed neither to adversaries nor to
authorized nodes by the routing messages. Exposure of the network
topology is maliciously utilized by adversaries to even destroy or capture
nodes.
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6.2

PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL FOR MOBILE AD HOC
NETWORKS

The mobile Ad hoc network routing protocols standardized by the IETF (rfc 3501) and
(rfc 4728), does not take into serious consideration the security threats and attack out
there. Hence the routing protocols for MANETs lack built-in security to mitigate attacks
and help secure the vulnerabilities of the mobile wireless Ad hoc networks.
Having conducted extensive research into the existing standard routing protocols for
MANETs, noted their security vulnerabilities and that of MANET as a network coupled
with the security attacks they face, a secure routing protocol is highly needed for mobile
Ad hoc networks to be of practical application in this technological age.
As a result, we hereby put forward “Authenticated Source Routing for Ad hoc Networks”
(ASRAN), a novel secure routing protocol enhancements for MANET. It is based on
DSR, a source-routing on-demand routing protocol. Its use of source routing makes it the
best suited for the mobility and dynamism that comes with MANETs. DSR was chosen as
the model protocol to use as a backbone for ASRAN because out of the MANET
prototypical routing protocols, DSR possesses the best characteristics, exhibited better
performance in experiments and simulations conducted as reviewed in earlier sections,
and possess mechanisms, which can easily be adapted to include security, while having
fewer vulnerabilities.

6.3

AUTHENTICATED SOURCE ROUTING FOR AD HOC NETWORKS
(ASRAN)

ASRAN makes use of cryptographic certificates to offer routing security. It builds upon
concepts from ARAN (a secure routing protocol adapted using AODV) [19] and also
SAODV [7], another proposal for security extensions to the AODV protocol to
specifically accommodate source routing as found in DSR.
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ASRAN consists of a preliminary certification process followed by a route instantiation
process that guarantees end-to-end authentication. Route discovery in ASRAN is
accomplished by a broadcast route discovery message from a source node with a reply
only from the intended destination node, hence intermediate node are no longer required
to send a reply on behalf of the destination node, if a route to it exists. The reply is such
that the routing messages are authenticated at each hop from source to destination, as well
on the reverse path from the destination to the source.

Figure 6.1

Simple MANET Topology Employed to Explain ASRAN

Table 6.1

Notations used for ASRAN
Public key of node A

Nonce issued by node A

Private key of node A

RDP

Route Discovery Packet

Encryption of packet p with key

RREP

Route Reply Packet

Packet p digitally signed by

SRR

Source Route Record

node A
Certificate belonging to node A

6.3.1

RERR

Route Error Packet

Timestamp

IP address of node A

Certificate expiration time

One way hash with input h

ASRAN Certification

ASRAN requires the use of a trusted certificate server T, whose public key will be known
to all valid nodes. They keys are initialized - that is generated and exchanged through an
existing, probably out of band relationship between T and each node. For a node to join
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the Ad hoc network, a certificate must be requested from T. Each node receives exactly
one certificate after securely authenticating their identity to T. We do not go into details in
this work in reference to the methods for secure authentication to the certificate server but
are left for developers and future work. Details of certificate revocation in ASRAN are
explained in the coming section.
After a node A requests and receives a certificate from T, after securely authenticating
their identity to T. A node A receives a certificate from T as follows:
……………………

Figure 6.2

(6.1)

ASRAN Certification

The certificate contains the IP address of A, the public key of A, a timestamp t of when
the certificate was generated, and a time e at which the certificate expires. These variables
are concatenated and signed by T. All nodes must maintain fresh and current certificates
with the trusted server. Nodes use these certificates to authenticate themselves to other
nodes during the exchange of routing messages.
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6.3.2

ASRAN Route Discovery

The purpose of end-to-end authentication is for the source to verify that the intended
destination was reached. We assume a bi-directional link and that the destination node
will choose the same route as a return path.

Figure 6.3

Route Discovery Packet (DSR and ASRAN)

Using the topology in figure 6.1, source node A, begins route discovery to destination X
by broadcasting to its neighbors a route discovery packet (RDP) secured thus:

…………

(6.2)

The route discovery packet includes a concatenation of Node A’s certificate and the IP
address of the destination (

), A’s certificate (

all digitally signed with node A’s private key

), a nonce

, and the current time t,

.

Each time node A performs route discovery, it will monotonically increase the nonce. The
nonce and timestamp are used in conjunction with each other to determine freshness of
message, and also uniquely identify. Other nodes then store the nonce they have last seen
for a particular node along with its timestamp.
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Once a node receives an RDP message, it sets up a reverse path back to the source by
making an entry in its route cache of the neighbor from which it received the RDP. This is
used as a verification mechanism on receipt of a reply packet. As we are assuming a bidirectional link, when a response is passed back from the destination to the source, on
getting to this node, the node will use its entry to verify that the next hop address
contained in the source route header tallies to the one which is in its route cache. This is
an integrity mechanism to ensure that the source route has not been tampered with.
The receiving node uses A’s public key, which it extracts from A’s certificate, to validate
the signature’s authenticity and verify that A’s certificate has not expired. The receiving
node also checks the (

) ordered list of elements (tuple), to verify that it has not

already processed this RDP. Nodes do not forward messages for which they have already
seen the tuple. However, if it has not seen the tuple previously, the node signs the
contents of the message, appends its own certificate, and forward broadcasts the message
to each of its neighbors. This signature prevents impersonation and or spoofing attacks
that may alter the route or form loops.
Taking Node B to be a neighbor that has received from A the RDP broadcast, it then
subsequently rebroadcasts thus:

…………

(6.3)

On receipt of the RDP, B’s neighbor, C validates the signature with the enclosed
certificate. C then strips B’s certificate and signature, makes a record of B as its
predecessor, signs the contents of the original message broadcast by A, appends its own
certificate and forward broadcasts the message. C then rebroadcasts the RDP onwards.

………
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(6.4)

Thus, these steps of validating the previous node’s signature, stripping the previous
node’s certificate and signature, making an entry of the previous node’s IP address into
the route cache, signing the original contents of the message while appending its own
certificate before forward broadcasting the message is repeated along the path by each
node until it reaches the destination node.
The source route within the RDP on reaching the destination node, is secure because the
RDP messages were signed at each hop on its way to the destination, hence malicious
nodes have no opportunity to redirect traffic with the attack exploits we discussed in the
previous section.

6.3.3

ASRAN Route Setup

Eventually, the route request message is received by the destination, X. The destination,
X, replies to the first RDP it receives for a particular source and given nonce. Hence, it
does not depend on the hop count recorded within the RDP but rather that the first RDP to
arrive must have traveled through a route with least congestion and delay to arrive first.
Therefore, ASRAN utilizes delay and will prefer a non-congested non-shortest path to a
congested shortest path because of the reduction in delay.
After receiving the RDP, the destination will generate a Route Reply packet (RREP)
using a record of the traversed nodes contained in the route request (RDP) packet. This is
the complete list of nodes back to the source node or the source route record (SRR). It
will then generate a one-way hash of the newly created SRR using as input the complete
source route record back to the source node to return a fixed length output 
. Having done all this, the destination node X will concatenate it into one bundle
as a response packet RREP, signing it with it’s private key, before unicasting the RREP
message along the reverse path through which it came, back to the source node.
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Figure 6.4

Route Response Packet (DSR and ASRAN)

Let the first node that receives the route reply RREP sent by the destination, X be node D.
The reply message RREP includes the certificate belonging to X (
with a hashed SSR (

) concatenated

, the source route record (SRR), the IP address of A (IPa), the

nonce and associated timestamp sent by A.

………

(6.5)

Nodes that receive the RREP message validate the authenticity of the node from which it
received it using the public key of the node on the digital signature. It checks the source
route node list (SRR) to ascertain the next hop it should forward the RREP message,
verifying that it is actually the correct route and next hop by checking if it corresponds
with the entry it made in its route cache previously for that source node RDP and nonce.
If everything tallies, it then signs the RREP and appends its own certificate before
forwarding the RREP message to the next hop (back to the predecessor from which the
original RDP was received). Each node along the reverse path does the same verification
and double-checking with its route cache entry, before signing the REP and appending its
certificate, then forwarding it along to the next hop on the way back to the source node.
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The verification of next hop in the source route record (SRR) in the RREP packet with the
nodes previous entry in the route cache is a mechanism to avoid and detect spoofing and
modification attacks.
Let D’s next hop to the source node be node C.

………

(6.6)

C validates D’s signature on the received message, removes the signature and certificate,
then signs the contents of the message and appends its own certificate before unicasting
the RREP to the next hop B.

……

(6.7)

Also, each node checks the nonce and signature of the previous hop as the RREP is
returned to the source. This avoids the attacks where malicious nodes instantiate routes by
impersonation and replay of X’s message. When the source node receives the RREP, it
verifies the destination’s signature and the nonce returned by the destination. It also runs
a hash of the SRR and compares it to the sent destination hashed value

to ensure

the integrity of the source route (SRR) and that no nodes were fabricated, injected or
deleted. This adds integrity mechanism to ASRAN’s route setup operation.

6.3.4

ASRAN Route Maintenance

ASRAN is an on-demand protocol, where nodes keep track of the recently used entries in
the route cache or simply whether the routes are active. If no traffic or usage has occurred
during an existing route’s lifetime, the route entry is simply removed from the route
cache. Route Error (RERR) messages are used by nodes to report links in active routes
that are broken due to node movement, shutdown etc. All RERR messages must be
signed.
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Figure 6.5

Route Error Packet (DSR and ASRAN)

For a route between a source node A and destination X, a node B generates the RERR
message for its neighbor C as follows:

………

(6.8)

This message is forwarded along the path toward the source without modification.
Because messages are signed, malicious nodes cannot generate RERR messages for other
nodes, but can for its node. This is because, it is difficult to detect when RERR messages
are fabricated for links that are truly active and broken. Also, the non-repudiation
provided by the signed ERR message allows a node to be verified as the source of each
RERR message that it sends. A node that generates and transmits large numbers of RERR
messages should be suspected, whether the RERR messages are valid or fabricated.
6.3.5

ASRAN Responses to Erratic Behavior

Erratic behavior can come from a malicious node, but it can also come from a friendly
node that is malfunctioning. ASRAN’s response does not differentiate between the two
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and regards all erratic behavior as the same. Erratic behavior includes the use of invalid
certificates, improperly signed messages, and misuse of route error messages. ASRAN’s
response to erratic behavior is an area for further work where an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), Watchdog and Path-rater mechanism [11] and or a trust based mechanism
can be integrated to handle responses to suspicious behavior.
6.3.6

ASRAN Key Revocation

A best effort immediate revocation service can be provided that is backed up by the use of
limited-time certificates. This is due to the desired low-overhead in wireless networks,
hence a trade-off between the standard of security (complexity) and cost.
When a certificate needs to be revoked, the trusted certificate server, T, sends a broadcast
message to the Ad hoc group of nodes to announce the revocation. Let us call the revoked
certificate,

, the transmission will appears as:
………………………

(6.9)

On receipt of this message by a node, it will re-broadcast it to its neighbors. Until the
revoked certificate’s normally expiration time elapses, these revocation notices will be
stored. Neighbors of the node with the revoked certificate, on receipt of the revocation
notice, will need to reform routing as necessary to avoid transmission through the now
un-trusted node. There is a problem with this method that is in the event that the untrusted node whose certificate was revoked is the sole connection between two parts of
the Ad hoc network. Hence there might be a partition of the network, which will last until
the un-trusted node is no longer the sole connection between the two partitions.

6.4

SECURITY ANALYSES AND APPRAISAL OF ASRAN

In this section, we provide a security analysis of ASRAN by the evaluation of its
robustness in the presence of the attacks we discussed in the section 4.6 above.

92

 Mitigation of Tunneling Attacks: Hop count is the metric of DSR which is the
underlying protocol on which ASRAN is built on. There is no way to guarantee
that one path is shorter than another based solely in terms of hop count. Taking
into consideration that tunneling attacks, such as the one presented in the section
above are possible in DSR and other prototypical MANET routing protocols,
designing a way of determining the best path is of utmost importance. Securing a
shortest path cannot be done by any means except by physical metrics such as a
timestamp in routing messages. However, according to ASRAN, the best and
shortest path is not a function of hop counts only, but mainly that of the least
delay as can be deduced from the timestamps. Therefore, malicious nodes will
find it difficult carrying out tunneling attacks in MANETs using ASRAN because
tunneling attacks normally is as a result of exploiting the vulnerability of a use of
hop count as the sole determinant of best route, which is not so in ASRAN.
ASRAN equates the best and shortest path as a function of time using timestamps,
and responds accordingly. Therefore, ASRAN will prevent most tunneling attacks.
 Spoofed Route Signaling: Source node messages can only be signed by its own
private key. Therefore, nodes cannot spoof other nodes in route instantiation or
discovery. Similarly, reply packets include the destination node’s certificate and
signature, ensuring that only the destination can respond to route discovery. This
prevents impersonation attacks where either the source or destination node is
spoofed.
 Unauthorized Participation: ASRAN participant nodes accept only packets that
have been signed with a certified key issued by the trusted authority. We did not
discuss mechanisms for authenticating users to the trusted certificate authority in
this work. There are numerous mechanisms with a significant list provided by
Schneier [2]. Also, in ASRAN, having a central trusted authority is vulnerable and
a single point of failure. This is an area for future work and improvement. A look
into threshold cryptography [38] as a way of achieving a distributed certification
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system or multiple redundant authorities as suggested by Zhou and Haas [13] can
be used.
 Replay Attack: Replay attacks are prevented by including a nonce and a
timestamp in the routing messages (RDP and REP).
 Fabricated Routing Messages: As only nodes with certificates can generate
messages, hence, messages can only be fabricated by nodes with certificates –
meaning valid authenticated nodes that has been hijacked or become malicious.
ASRAN does not have provision to mitigate such attacks or those by selfish
nodes. However, ASRAN does offer a deterrent by ensuring non-repudiation
services. A node that continues to inject false messages into the network may be
excluded from future route computation.
 Integrity and Alteration of Routing Messages: ASRAN specifies that all fields of
RDP and REP messages remain unchanged between source and destination using
an integrity enforcing mechanism. Since both packet types are signed by the
initiating node, any alterations in transit would be immediately detected by
intermediary nodes along the path resulting in the altered packet subsequently
discarded. A further enhancement of security in ASRAN in this respect is that the
final node - the source as the case maybe, now has the ability to verify that there
were no alterations in the route list by making use of the hashed SRR included in
the REP message. It will run the appended SRR through the hashing algorithm in
use and compare with the already hashed one transmitted from the destination
node. This ensures integrity in ASRAN and corrects a flaw of ARAN, whereby
only the intermediate nodes can detect alterations with no provision for the final
node to detect it too, enabling a vulnerability which is that the last intermediate
node might be able to successfully alter the packet contents as there will be no
other intermediate nodes to detect it.
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6.5

COMPARISON OF ASRAN TO EXISTING SECURE ROUTING

Here we are going to compare our proposed security enhancement - Authenticated Source
Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ASRAN) - to the existing secure routing solutions we have
already reviewed in this thesis (chapter 5). The comparison is based on the
protection/defense rendered against security threats and attacks facing MANETs.

Table 6.2

Defense against attacks
Protocols

Attacks

ASRAN

ARAN

SRP

SEAD

Ariadne

SAODV Watchdog
and Pathrater

Location Disclosure

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Black Hole

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Replay

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Wormhole

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Blackmail

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

No

Denial of Service

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Routing table

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Spoofing

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Integrity/Alteration

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

poisoning
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SIMULATION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

7.1

SIMULATION
We implement and run a simulation for ASRAN to verify and validate its

performance in varying degree of mobility for a performance metric. The performance
metric used is “Route Acquisition Time”. We used Network Simulator (NS-2), a discrete
event simulator for our simulated experiments.

While Not Empty (Event Queue) Do
dequeue(m)

/*earlier event from EventQueue*/

update(clock)
simulate(m)
enqueue()

/* enqueue any events produced */
EndWhile

7.1.1

Performance Metrics
The following performance metrics were used for evaluating the proposed secure

routing protocol (ASRAN).
(i)

Route Acquisition Time: The time it takes a source node to find a route to
a destination node.

(ii)

Pause Time: This is the degree of mobility of a node.
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Figure 7.1

7.1.2

Simulation Block Diagram

Simulation Parameters

The different parameters considered for the simulation are shown in Table 6.2 below
Table 7.1

Simulation Test-bed
Parameter

Simulation Software
Node density
Maximum velocity
Environment Size
Traffic Type
CBR (Packet Rate)
Pause Times (mobility)
Mobility model employed
Size of packets
Error Margin

Value
Network Simulator (NS-2)
20
20m/s
1200m x 300m
CBR (Constant Bit Rate)
4 (kb/s)
0 to 500secs (interval time of 100)
Random waypoint model
512 bytes
±0.003
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7.1.3

Methodology

We correlate the published DSR and our proposed protocol (ASRAN). This is done by
modifying the NS-2 Tcl/Tk. We modified the written Tcl/Tk script to take into account
the changes and security mechanisms added in the route acquisition process as discussed
earlier. The modified Tcl/Tk script implements the proposed ASRAN protocol. The
simulation was repeated four times with the same conditions and the mean is shown

Route Acquisition Time (ms)

below.

50
40
30

ASRAN

20

DSR

10
0
0

100

200

300

Pause Time (secs)
Figure 7.2

Simulation Results
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400

500

Table 7.2

Simulation result values

Pause Time (seconds)

Route Acquisition
Time (milliseconds)

0

100

200

300

400

500

30

26

23

20

15

12

ASRAN 37

32

27

23

17

14

0.813

0.852

0.869

0.882

0.857

DSR

Coefficient of Correlation

0.811

Mean Coefficient of Correlation  5.084/6 = 0.847

7.1.4

Discussion

The simulation result leads us to the following observations:
The Route Acquisition Time is increased, indicating that the security additions and
implementations introduced some latency.
ASRAN has a higher route acquisition time or delay at higher mobility (lower pause
time). This is as a result of a high demand of routes as routes already acquired changes at
a higher frequency due to the highly dynamic topology (mobility).
The co-efficient of correlation from the simulation for the route acquisition metric
evaluated for both DSR and ASRAN is an indication of the behavior of ASRAN in
relation to DSR. The mean coefficient value comes out to be 0.847 which shows that our
proposed ASRAN is in close proximity with the published DSR protocol in terms of
performance.
Finally, we deduce that the performance (latency) trade-off as a result of security
additions and implementations in ASRAN is negligible.
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7.2

CONCLUSION

Wireless mobile Ad hoc networks differ in many ways to the conventional wire-line
networks. The characteristics of MANET which are – dynamic changing topology;
absence of Infrastructure; Limited resources and energy constraints – pose a lot of
security challenges for the network.

The very basic nature of the mode of

communication (radio spectrum) and possibility of high node mobility brings about a lot
of vulnerabilities and insecurity. Security is an essential requirement for networks.
However, the standard MANET routing protocols published have negligible or no
security mechanisms. This makes them and MANET network highly insecure and
susceptible to a variety of security attacks. Secure routing in Ad hoc networks is the main
focus of our research. Authenticated Source Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ASRAN)
routing protocol has been proposed and simulated for performance. We summarize our
contributions as follows:
1.

We conducted a performance evaluation of various MANET routing protocols of
different types, mainly focusing on the flat-routing protocols. The routing
protocols were analyzed to assess their relative strength and weaknesses.

2. From our study results, we selected DSR as our prototype protocol as it is the best
routing protocol for providing secure routing because there are no periodic
beacons, thus resulting in a lesser overhead during communication.
3. We analyzed the various attacks targeting the DSR protocol and MANET at large
and reviewed existing work in secure routing protocols.
4. We introduced a novel secure routing protocol termed as “Authenticated Source
Routing for Ad hoc Network” (ASRAN). The proposed protocol is a source
routing protocol based on DSR and employs certificate. We basically modified the
route acquisition process of DSR, adding security mechanism to mitigate the
existing vulnerabilities.
5. The proposed algorithm was compared to existing secure routing protocols. Also,
we simulated and compared ASRAN to DSR to establish its route acquisition time
and correlation of performance.
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7.3

FUTURE WORK

This work opens new avenues for future research. The research can be extended in
several directions and some of them are summarized below:
1. The proposed protocol, ASRAN, uses a certification server for initialization and
administration of certificates. The method for the authentication of the nodes to
the certificate server is an area to be researched and developed further.
2. As ASRAN security improvements were mainly in its route acquisition process,
securing further the data transmission stage is an area for future work.
3. In the presented work, the selfish nodes are not dealt with; it would be interesting
as an area for improvement, the design and integration of security mechanisms
capable of mitigating both selfish and malicious nodes activities.
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